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Given that public safety answering points (PSAPs or 9-1-1 dispatch centers) are 
undergoing a process of consolidation, should that consolidation occur as a function of 
simple geographic proximity or discipline? This thesis investigated the differences among 
different dispatch disciplines, the effect of dispatching on interoperability, case studies 
investigating the operations of several different models of PSAP consolidation, and a 
theoretical case study involving inter-discipline and intra-discipline consolidation of 
PSAPs in King County, Washington.  
A survey of nine PSAPs of various sizes, types, and regions was conducted to 
determine their capabilities in voice and operational interoperability, how often 
opportunities to take advantage of that interoperability were encountered, and finally, to 
what extent interoperability was exercised when those opportunities did present 
themselves. 
The findings indicated intra-discipline interoperability (fire-to-fire or law 
enforcement-to-law enforcement) is not only intuitively of more value than inter-
discipline interoperability (law enforcement-to-fire) but is actually prioritized by PSAPs 
in their day-to-day operations. Given that PSAP consolidation is occurring, the 
conclusion of this thesis is that interoperability within disciplines can be best improved 
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Public safety answering points (PSAPs or 9-1-1 dispatch centers) are an essential 
component of emergency response. Since they act as the hub for communications for the 
agencies they serve, PSAPs play a direct role in interoperability. Efforts to consolidate 
PSAPs to reduce costs and avoid duplication of resources are increasing. The typical 
model for PSAP consolidation is to combine smaller PSAPs primarily due to geographic 
proximity, which places law enforcement, fire and emergency medical service (EMS) 
agencies under one roof. Given that consolidation is occurring, this thesis sought to 
answer whether interoperability would be better served by consolidating PSAPs by 
discipline rather than geography. 
Since 9/11, the prevailing wisdom has been that emergency responders require 
voice interoperability unit-to-unit and member-to-member across disciplines. However, 
research indicates that this may, in fact, be counter-productive. First, all disciplines 
communicating on the same channel can overload both responders and the radio system; 
second, different disciplines, while coordinating for the same overall incident outcome, 
concentrate on discrete incident objectives; and third, different disciplines do not possess 
the organizational knowledge to communicate effectively with other disciplines. 
This is not true of intra-discipline communications (e.g., police-to-police, fire-to-
fire), which are crucial. Police or fire agencies, when working with another jurisdiction 
within the same discipline at an incident, will likely end up working on the same task 
need to coordinate unit-to-unit. Since inter-discipline coordination (e.g., police-to-fire) is 
not taking place at the task level, neither should the communications; they should occur 
at the strategic level, at a unified command post. 
Nine PSAPs nationwide were surveyed with regard to their interoperable 
communications capacity. Results indicated that in practice, PSAPs exercise their intra-
discipline interoperability at nearly every opportunity; between disciplines, rarely so, 
even though they possess equal capacity to do so. Reasons given were predominately 
because law enforcement and fire have no real need to communicate tactically. Given that 
 xvii 
intra-discipline interoperability seems to have greater practical value that inter-discipline 
interoperability and that PSAPs function as the communications, command, and control 
centers for the agencies they serve, regional interoperability would be best served by 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT—BACKGROUND 
The 9-11 dispatch center, or public safety answering point (PSAP) has become an 
increasingly important facet of emergency response. Not only is it the prime connection 
between the public and the response agency for initial reporting of emergencies, but is 
also the point at which a response to those emergencies is generated. No matter how 
many resources, apparatus, members or training an agency possesses, without the ability 
to receive reports of emergencies and generate a response such capabilities are wasted. 
Responsibilities extend beyond simply answering calls and sending responses; 
however. PSAPs also typically monitor the status and location of agency resources, 
maintain adequate coverage of the jurisdiction by agency assets, and act as the primary 
hub of radio communications between units in the field and the agency. In effect, they are 
the command and control centers for the jurisdictions they serve. 
There are over 8,000 PSAPs in the United States,1 with a majority small in size 
and associated with a single municipal or county public safety agency.2 In 2012, for 
example, L. R. Kimball reported that Connecticut was home to 106 PSAPs: 17 
consolidated centers, eight state police PSAPs, and 82 stand-alone centers.3 In addition, 
56 percent of California’s PSAPs have only three workstations or less,4 and nationally 85 
percent of PSAPs have from one to seven workstations.5 Each PSAP, regardless of size, 
1 Federal Communications Commission, “PSAP Registry” 2012, 
http://transition.fcc.gov/pshs/services/911-services/enhanced911/psapregistry.html  
2 Trevor Womack, “Economies of Scale: Increasing Emergency 9-1-1 Communications Center 
Efficiency as a Means to Better Protect the Homeland,” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013). 
3 Shawn Walker et al., “Connecticut PSAP Consolidation Study: Presentation of Findings” 
[powerpoint] January 18, 2012, 
http://www.ct.gov/despp/lib/despp/oset/state_of_ct_report_presentation_final_01182012.pdf  
4 Governor’s Office of Emergency Services, California 9-1-1 Strategic Plan 2010, July 2010, 
http://www.caloes.ca.gov/PSC/Documents/911/pdf/911%20Strategic%20Plan.pdf, 5.  
5 National Emergency Number Association, A Public Safety Answering Point Managers’ Guide to 




                                                 
requires physical space; administrative, technological, and personnel resources; and a 
large infrastructure that is expensive to purchase, upgrade, and maintain. This, coupled 
with financial constraints, caused by almost universal reductions in revenue to state and 
local governments across the United States, has fueled interest in consolidation of these 
smaller PSAPs to avoid duplication of equipment and staff.6 While not a new concept, 
the interest in consolidation appears to have increased over the past five years.7 Best 
practice would dictate that in a given geographic area, there should always be two PSAPs 
for continuity of operations, according to the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC): “The PSAP should also consider arranging with another PSAP for backup and 
support in the event of total failure or abandonment of the PSAP.”8 
In the context of homeland security events, which tend to be multidisciplinary and 
multijurisdictional, interoperability is a key factor for success. Responses to 9/11,9 the 
Oso mudslides in Washington, the Boston Marathon bombing, and other large incidents 
bear this out. Voice interoperability (the ability for responders to communicate with each 
other) and operational interoperability (the ability to operate with responders from 
different disciplines or agencies) are of paramount importance. The PSAP, which is hub 
of communications and command and control, are in a unique position to facilitate this 
interoperability, and consolidation efforts should be leveraged to achieve interoperability 
to the greatest extent. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
To further interoperability, should PSAPs discipline be a primary factor in PSAP 
consolidation? 
6 Keri Lovaso, “PSAP Consolidation: Effective Practices & Recommendations,” Public Safety 
Communications, November 1, 2010, http://psc.apcointl.org/2010/11/01/psap-consolidation/ 
7 Chuck Raasch, “Recession-battered Cities Combine Services,” USA Today, October 19, 2012, 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/10/18/recession-hit-cities-combines-services/1634301/ 
8 Federal Communications Commission, Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, “Emergency 
Planning: Public Safety Answering Points,” accessed January 24, 2014, 
http://transition.fcc.gov/pshs/emergency-information/guidelines/psaps.html 
9 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States [9/11 Commission], The Final 
Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (New York, W.W. Norton 
& Company, 2004), 314. 
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Many of the issues considered by this research were brought to light in the wake 
of the terrorist attacks of September 2001, and thus the literature is limited. That which 
does exist can be organized into the following categories: 
• Consolidation feasibility studies 
• Trade magazine articles and literature by professional organizations 
• PSAP publications and reports 
• Interoperability initiatives 
• Government reports 
• Academic works 
1. Consolidation Feasibility Studies 
With the recent economic downturn resulting in reduced revenue for state and 
local entities, interest in consolidation has increased over the past five years,10 and a 
number of PSAP studies have been enjoined to determine the feasibility of PSAP 
consolidation. The consolidation studies examined for this review shared similar findings 
regarding the benefits and challenges of consolidation.  
The financial benefits generally center on economy of scale. Consolidating 
multiple PSAPs under one roof reduces only the cost and maintenance cost of the 
physical plant, but also 9-1-1 infrastructures contained within. Expensive equipment 
necessary at each PSAP, such as trunked lines, public branch exchange (PBX), recorders, 
and all of their attendant back-up systems and redundancies required at each PSAP would 
no longer be duplicated among many. The reduction in 9-1-1 infrastructures would result 
in less to maintain and upgrade as well, which would lead to a decrease in information 
technology (IT) professionals required to manage the system. Administrative overhead is 
also reduced with consolidation, as is the need for upper level staff and directors. 
While floor personnel and supervisors will likely not decrease, the programs that 
support them—hiring, training and continuing education—will benefit from the pooling 
of resources. Such programs may in fact be enhanced, as a larger PSAP generates greater 
10 Raasch, “Recession-battered Cities Combine Services.” 
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purchasing power. A larger PSAP and its greater pool of employees can more easily 
absorb personnel attrition, which is 20 percent nationally.11  
Interoperability benefits could also be realized by consolidation. Resource 
management of overlapping jurisdictions could be managed by a single point of contact 
that would enhance mutual aid and regional response. In addition, a common PSAP 
would require common communications equipment and terminology, which means 
different jurisdictions would be using the same equipment and less parochial verbiage. 
Common voice communications would be complimented by a common computer aided 
dispatch (CAD) system, which would improve inter-agency data transfer.  
Feasibility studies, such as those by GeoComm,12 L. Robert Kimball,13 and 
Cleveland State University14 (2005), and the firm of L. Robert Kimball (2007) also 
identified challenges inherent in consolidation. Any consolidation of agencies under a 
common operating format necessitates a certain level of subordination of individual 
agency goals to the good of the whole. Long held procedures and traditions may need to 
change, which will incur resistance among members and agencies who do not wish to 
lose local control. The same is true for the dispatchers assigned to the PSAPs that are 
assimilated. The personnel issue goes beyond a loss of autonomy, however, different 
dispatchers from the amalgamated agencies may have disparate pay, benefit packages, 
and personnel regulations. In fact, the reduction in IT and administrative staff that garners 
economic benefits for the PSAP will cause a loss of hours or positions for these workers. 
Moreover, service concerns can result from a loss of municipal or agency legacy 
knowledge when geographic areas served become larger. Additionally, political and 
governance issues can also derail consolidation.  
11 Valley Communications Center, “2012 Annual Report,” 15  
12 GeoComm, King County, Washington PSAP Consolidation Assessment of the King County E9-1-1 
System: Existing Conditions Report, October 2012, 
kingcounty.gov/~/media/safety/E911/documents/GeoComm_PSAP_Consolidation_Assesment.ashx 
13 Walker et al., “Connecticut PSAP Consolidation Study: Presentation of Findings.”  
14 Daila Shimek, Kimberly R. Vining, and Scott Winograd, Case Studies for Consolidated Public 
Safety Dispatch Center Feasibility Study: The Next Steps (Cleveland, OH: Cleveland State University and 
Maxine Goodman Levin College of Urban Affairs, 2011), 
http://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1422&context=urban_facpub   
 4 
                                                 
The potential of bias must be taken into account when considering consolidation 
studies. The possible bias stems from the fact that they are often undertaken by 
consulting firms retained by government agencies seeking to find cost savings through 
consolidation. Since the consulting firms are private entities whose income is tied to 
getting new business, a possible conflict of interest lies in the fact that they may be prone 
to tell governments what they want to hear in terms of consolidation.  
2. Trade Magazine Articles and Literature by Professional 
Organizations 
Trade magazine articles and releases by professional organizations, such as the 
National Emergency Number Association (NENA) and the Association of Public-Safety 
Communications Officials (APCO), generally present a generic or neutral position 
regarding consolidation of dispatch centers. None were found to be devoted to the 
concept of regional fire dispatching, and most were often simply a reporting of a recently 
released feasibility study or governmental decision to move forward with consolidation. 
Many deal with political obstacles, or technological problems involved in consolidating 
PSAPs with different alerting/, radio or CAD systems. This includes articles on specific 
PSAP or general IT consolidation efforts with a focus upon the actual brand of 
technology being implemented or referencing problems involving the integration of the 
police mobile data computer system.15 In a report issued in 2010, the Communications 
Security, Reliability and Interoperability Council concluded that there are clear benefits 
to consolidation in the vast majority of cases.16 
Sue Pivetta of Professional Pride presents a thorough description of the different 
functions of telecommunicators in her 911 Emergency Communications Manual.17 This 
15 “Ann Arbor and Washtenaw County, Mich., Co-Locate 911 Staffs in One Dispatch Center,” Digital 
Communities, June 21, 2010, http://www.digitalcommunities.com/articles/Ann-Arbor-and-Washtenaw-
County-Mich.html  
16 Communications Security, Reliability and Interoperability Council (Working Group #1A), Key 
Findings and Effective Practices for Public Safety Consolidation: Final Report, Federal Communications 
Commission, October 2010, http://transition.fcc.gov/pshs/docs/csric/CSRIC-1A-Report.pdf, 4. 
17 Sue Pivetta, 911 Emergency Communications Manual, 4th ed. (Sumner, WA: Professional Pride, 
2003).  
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reference also details the similarities and difference between the three major disciplines 
(law enforcement, fire, and EMS) of emergency telecommunications. 
3. PSAP Publications and Reports 
Most PSAPs issue an annual report detailing their call processing times, 
performance, staffing, call volume, budgets, agencies served and service areas. Because 
these reports are largely an amalgamation of statistics that are easily verified, they can be 
relied upon as accurate. 
4. Interoperability Initiatives and Reports 
Post 9/11, voice interoperability became a focus for the emergency response and 
homeland security enterprise. The prevailing wisdom on the matter is crystalized in the  
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) National Security Communications Plan, 
issued in July 2008, which describes its vision as 
to ensure emergency response personnel at all levels of government and 
across all disciplines can communicate as needed, on demand, and as 
authorized, through improvements in communications operability, 
interoperability, and continuity nationwide.18  
This is sentiment is repeated by the Government Accounting Office (GAO) in its 
2007 report (GAO-07-301)19 and by the National Task Force on Interoperability in its 
publications Why Can’t We Talk? Working Together to Bridge the Communications Gap 
to Save Lives and When They Can’t Talk Lives are Lost from 2003.20 DHS, through its 
SAFECOM initiative, has echoed this reasoning in documents such as the 
Interoperability Continuum from 2007, the Statement of Requirements (SoR)  from 2004, 
18 Department of Homeland Security, National Emergency Communications Plan, July 2008, 
http://www.safecomprogram.gov/necp/nationalemergencycommplan_aug08_v2.pdf, 2. 
19 Government Accounting Office, First Responders: Much Work Remains to Improve 
Communications Interoperability (GAO-07-301) April 2007. 
20 National Task Force on Interoperability, Why Can’t We Talk? Working Together to Bridge the 
Communications Gap to Save Lives, 2003, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/204348.pdf; National 
Criminal Justice Reference System, When They Can’t Talk Lives are Lost , 2003, 
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/211512.pdf 
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and the Statewide Communication Interoperability Plan (SCIP) Methodology published 
in 2007. 
Not surprisingly, there are many state interoperability plans that reflect this 
position due to the fact that the government publications listed above were used, by 
design, as tools and templates for the formulation of those documents. A possible 
criticism of the promulgation of the concept that all disciplines require voice 
interoperability with each other is that the conclusion is not data-driven but appears to 
derive from anecdotal evidence. 
The FEMA National Incident Management System (NIMS) offers a different bite 
at the interoperability apple by focusing on functional operability as opposed to voice 
interoperability.21 It proscribes a national standard for using an incident command 
structure with a unified command capability so that all stakeholders in an incident have a 
representative with decision-making ability co-located at a command post and able to 
communicate directives to units within the discipline he or she represents. 
5. Government Reports 
The 9/11 Commission Report, regarding the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, 
provides a thorough review of the events of that day. It highlights that the communication 
and coordination difficulties at both the World Trade Center and the Pentagon hampered 
operations.22 The McKinsey Report issued by New York Police Department (NYPD) in 
the wake of 9/11 identified several communications command and control, and 
technological issues that plagued the response.23  
The After Action Report on the Response to the September 11 Terrorist Attack on 
the Pentagon delineated communications problems at that incident as well. It noted that 
due to communications overload early on in the incident, “in the first few hours, foot 
21 Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], Unit 6: NIMS Command and Management 
[powerpoint], http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/IS700a/IG%20files/IS700A_InstructorGuide_L6.pdf, 
6.17–6.19 
22 9/11 Commission, The Final Report of the National Commission, 278–323. 
23 McKinsey & Company, Improving NYPD Emergency Preparedness and Response, August 2002, 
file:///Users/chdsstudent/Downloads/nypdemergency.pdf, 33–34.  
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messengers at times proved to be the most reliable means of communicating.”24 
Furthermore, the report notes that not only was voice interoperability between disciplines 
not established, but that fire operations were separated into divisions each with their own 
radio channel to cut down on transmission saturation. Also according to the report, EMS 
was directed to its own channel, as were law enforcement units—each function (i.e., 
evidence recovery, perimeter security, motors, and special weapons and tactics) had a 
dedicated channel. This separation of communication both geographically and by 
discipline contributed to the success of the operation to the extent that the after action 
report suggests expanding pre-planning radio separation by function: “Radio channel and 
talk group allocation for fire and rescue command, operations, and logistics functions 
should be preplanned, established early, and clearly communicated.”25 Inter-discipline 
interoperability was achieved through adherence to a unified command structure per the 
National Incident Management System. 
6. Academic Works 
Currently, there are no theses located by this researcher on the subject of 
discipline-based PSAP consolidation. While not addressing PSAP consolidation directly, 
Trevor Womack, in a 2014 thesis for the Naval Postgraduate School, entitled “Economies 
of Scale: 9-1-1 Center Consolidation as a Means to Strengthen the Homeland Security 
Enterprise,” concluded that PSAP consolidation can result in increased cost efficiency 
through economies of scale and standardize and raise the quality of service across 
disciplines and jurisdictions on a regional level. In a 2006 thesis entitled “Radio 
Interoperability: Addressing the Real Reasons We Don’t Communicate Well at 
Emergencies,” Ronald P. Timmons argues that the homeland security enterprise, in its 
zeal for interoperability, is addressing the problem as a technological issue that may 
24 Titan Systems Corporation, After Action Report on the Response to the September 11 Terrorist 
Attack on the Pentagon (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002), A-10. 
25 Ibid., A-38. 
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exacerbate, rather than alleviate, communications at emergencies. He suggests instead 
that the solution lies in better procedures exercised regularly at daily, routine incidents.26 
While few sources directly deal with dispatcher specialization in fire or police 
dispatching, in a paper for the National Fire Academy, Robert Junell noted that 
specialization enhances productivity and that exposure to variety has a nonlinear 
influence on productivity (i.e., “too much variety” can impede learning). This was 
tempered by his finding that a proper balance between specialization and exposure to a 
variety leads to the highest productivity.27 
There have been studies in other fields related to job and skill specialization. In 
1983, Rosen noted a maximized rate of return through the utilization of specialized skills 
as intensively as possible, generally in labor28 In study of the Japanese banking industry 
in 2012, Staats and Gino recorded that productivity improves with job specialization over 
the course of a single day; however, examined across a number of days, variety improved 
productivity.29 
D. METHOD OF INQUIRY 
This thesis begins with an examination of the function of PSAPs, the positions 
and duties of telecommunicators who work within them, and the differences between the 
different dispatch disciplines. In addition, this thesis analyzed the concept of 
interoperability, beginning with an exploration of the prevailing wisdom on the subject. It 
also examined the differences between functional interoperability (different jurisdictions/
disciplines operating with one another at an emergency scene) and voice interoperability 
(the ability for units to communicate via radio at an emergency scene, across 
jurisdictions/disciplines). The notion of inter-discipline interoperability (i.e., law 
26 Ronald P. Timmons, “Radio Interoperability: Addressing the Real Reasons We Don’t Communicate 
Well During Emergencies” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), 83 
27 Robert Junell, “Consolidation Versus Separate Fire and Police Communications Centers,” 
Emmitsburg, MD: National Fire Academy, 1991.  
28 Sherwin Rosen, “Specialization and Human Capital,” Journal of Labor Economics 1, no. 1 (1983): 
43–49. 
29 Bradley R. Staats and Francesca Gino, “Specialization and Variety in Repetitive Tasks: Evidence 
from a Japanese Bank,” Management Science 58, no. 6 (2012): 1141–1159. 
 9 
                                                 
enforcement-to-fire) and intra-discipline interoperability (fire-to-fire and law-
enforcement-to-law enforcement) is also analyzed, with the intent of determining which 
is more valuable in the mitigation of routine and homeland security level incidents. 
Examples of incidents featuring communication failures are studied to illustrate the 
interoperability problem relative to the prevailing wisdom on the subject. 
The research also includes a mini-case study of nine PSAPs, which concentrates 
on their capabilities in terms of functional and voice interoperability, both inter- and 
intra-discipline. The PSAPs selected represent a cross-section of PSAPs in terms of size 
and location, as well as type of discipline served (single discipline [law enforcement or 
fire only] and multi-discipline [police and fire]). Case study data was obtained through a 
survey (see Appendix A) of PSAP directors. The survey attempted to divine not only the 
capacity of interoperability of the selected PSAPs, but also the degree to which that 
capacity was realized and why it was or was not utilized to its full potential. 
In addition, the researcher also completed a hypothetical case study for King 
County, Washington, whose PSAP network is undergoing a consolidation assessment. 
Using information obtained from King County’s consolidation assessment report, two 
scenarios were considered: consolidation under a multi-discipline model and a model 
where consolidation was separated by discipline. Using the analysis of data compiled 
earlier in the thesis, each model’s respective potential positive and negative outcomes 




A. PSAP INFORMATION  
A PSAP is “an entity operating under common management which receives 9-1-1 
calls from a defined geographic area and processes those calls according to a specific 
operational policy.”30 Commonly known as a 9-1-1 or dispatch center, the PSAP is a 
central location for the receipt of 9-1-1 emergency calls for law enforcement, fire, and/or 
emergency medical services (EMS). There are two different types of PSAPs in the United 
States, dependent upon how the 9-1-1 call is processed: 
• Primary PSAP: A primary PSAP receives 9-1-1 calls directly from the 
public. It may process those calls itself or transfer the call to another 
agency. An example of a primary PSAP is the Seattle Police 
Communications Center. All 9-1-1 calls within the city of Seattle are 
received by this center. If the call regards a law enforcement problem, it is 
processed by Seattle Police Communications. If the call is for a fire or 
medical emergency, it is transferred to the Fire Alarm Center to be 
processed. 
• Secondary PSAP: A secondary PSAP does not receive 9-1-1 calls directly 
from the public; rather, the calls are received by a primary PSAP and 
transferred to the secondary PSAP for processing. In the example above, 
the Fire Alarm Center is a secondary PSAP—all calls received by the Fire 
Alarm Center are transfers from Seattle Police Communications. 
Regardless if they are primary or secondary, PSAPs may be organized into one or 
more of the following categories: 
• Single agency PSAP: A PSAP that processes calls for a single agency. The 
agency may be of any public safety discipline (law enforcement, fire, or 
EMS). 
• Consolidated PSAP: A PSAP that processes calls for multiple agencies. 
Typically, the agencies contract with the PSAP for such services under a 
governance structure that gives all agencies a voice in the operation of the 
PSAP. 
• Single-discipline PSAP: Regardless of the number of agencies served, all 
of the agencies are of a single discipline (law enforcement, fire, or EMS). 
30 National Emergency Number Association Development Steering Committee, NENA Master 




                                                 
Note that many fire departments in the United States are primary providers 
for EMS to their jurisdictions; in such cases, they would be considered one 
discipline. In those jurisdictions where EMS is a third service, fire and 
EMS would be considered separate disciplines. 
• Multi-discipline PSAP: A PSAP that processes calls for agencies of 
different disciplines, such as police and fire. All multi-discipline PSAPs 
are by definition consolidated centers. 
PSAPs have become an essential facet of emergency response. Not only are 
PSAPs the prime connection between the public and the response agency for initial 
reporting of emergencies, but are also the point at which a response to those emergencies 
is generated. No matter how many resources, apparatus, members, or trainings an agency 
possesses, without the ability to efficiently receive reports of emergencies and generate a 
response, such capabilities are wasted. 
Responsibilities extend beyond simply answering calls and sending responses; 
however, PSAPs also typically monitor the status and location of agency resources, 
maintain adequate coverage of the jurisdiction by agency assets, and act as the primary 
hub of radio communications between units in the field and the agency. 
Because of the critical role PSAPs play in emergency response, it is paramount 
that their key operational systems have a capacity for continuity of operations in exigent 
circumstances.31 There are redundancies to phone systems, power systems, computer 
systems and computer aided dispatch (CAD) systems, among others. In fact, PSAPs are 
considered so mission critical that, despite all of the redundancies within the PSAP, the 
FCC recommends as a best practice that, in a given geographic area, there should always 
be two PSAPs for continuity of operations: “The PSAP should also consider arranging 
with another PSAP for backup and support in the event of total failure or abandonment of 
the PSAP.”32 The reason for this is simple: if an event occurs that renders the PSAP 
untenable or unusable—an earthquake, bomb threat, or gas leak, for example—that PSAP 
can continue operations in a back-up facility. Due to the highly technical and specialized 
31 Federal Communications Commission, “Public Safety Tech Topic #14: Diversity, Redundancy, and 
Resiliency—In That Order,” accessed April 20, 2014, http://www.fcc.gov/help/public-safety-tech-topic-14-
diversity-redundancy-and-resiliency-order  
32 Federal Communications Commission, “Emergency Planning: Public Safety Answering Points.”  
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nature of the PSAP and its equipment, only another PSAP can serve as a back-up facility 
if the level of service is not to be completely compromised. 
B. TELECOMMUNICATOR FUNCTIONS  
With more than 8,000 PSAPs in the United States,33 there are operational 
differences that make defining the operations of a “typical dispatch center” difficult.34 
However, there are basic functions performed by personnel in most PSAPs. Although 
referred to as dispatchers or telecommunicators in general, PSAP personnel perform these 
basic functions, typically in discrete positions, aided by a CAD system. Depending upon 
the size of the PSAP, the staffing model utilized and the operating framework of the 
PSAP in question, some of these functions may be combined into one position: 
• Call taker: Answers incoming 9-1-1 calls and gathers information 
necessary to send a response. 
• Dispatcher: Dispatches responding units, tracks unit status and location, 
and monitors status of incidents. 
• Radio: Maintains communications between the PSAP and field units 
• Supervisor: In charge of dispatch operations on PSAP floor 
• PSAP director: Supervises administration of the PSAP (budget, policy, 
hiring, training, etc.) 
C. DISPATCH DISCIPLINES  
While these positions and functions are utilized to some degree in all dispatch 
centers and by all disciplines, police, fire, and EMS dispatching are very different in 
practice. 
1. Law Enforcement Dispatching 
Although about 85 percent of all 9-1-1 calls are made for law enforcement 
services,35 the majority of these are not for “in-progress” emergencies but reports of 
33 Federal Communications Commission, “PSAP Registry.” 
34 Pivetta, 911 Emergency Communications Manual. 7. 
35 Ibid., 8. 
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incidents that have already occurred.36 Since the event has already transpired, there no 
danger of loss of life or property. Most incidents of this nature simply require 
investigation, a case report, and follow up from an officer. Thus, such calls may be 
“held” or “stacked” until the police unit assigned to that geographic sector is available to 
respond. In this way, patrol units can be kept in their assigned areas instead of assigning 
an officer from an adjacent area.37 In some cases (typically in municipalities over 25,000 
residents), there may be no response at all by a sworn law enforcement officer; the 
incident will be handled by a community service officer, administrative units or other 
alternative responders.38 The call may not be an emergency, but still requires data to be 
taken from the caller and recorded by the call taker (either manually or in CAD) so the 
police unit has the information when it eventually responds.  
Police officers are constantly out on patrol, resulting in traffic stops, investigation 
of suspicious activity, and responses to citizen input.39 In the course of patrolling, 
officers place demands on dispatchers and radio operators by generating requests for 
information. Officers in the field may request information on warrants, license plates, or 
report traffic stops. Since officers are potentially at risk with each such contact, they 
report their location to the PSAP so assistance can be sent should the situation become 
dangerous. Radio must take the report, and the dispatcher tracks the units as they 
respond, arrive, and monitors any activity or request until units clear the scene. Such 
requests often result in searches of various local and national databases. According to 
Pivetta, “Many times the emergency communications personnel working with these 
systems are the field units only link to that information. It is vital that 
Telecommunicators’ training be extensive in these areas of information gathering and 
dissemination.”40 This information, once discovered, must be reported back to the officer 
who requested it; thus, police radio is a busy and vital function of law enforcement 
36 Ibid., 12. 
37 Tom McEwen et al., Call Management and Community Policing: A Guidebook for Law 
Enforcement Report, U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2003, 
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/Publications/e05031968_web.txt  
38 Pivetta, 911 Emergency Communications Manual, 12. 
39 Ibid., 111. 
40 Ibid., 123. 
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dispatching. 
Not all calls are simple reports or requests that can be held. In-progress calls, 
where life or property is at risk, make up a smaller portion of police 9-1-1 calls. In these 
cases, if the officer who is serving the geographic area of the emergency is busy, the call 
must be re-assigned to another officer. This is generally simple, as with few exceptions, 
police units generally have the same resources and capabilities. While motorcycle units 
cannot, for example, transport prisoners, and the obvious exceptions of specialty units 
(SWAT, K-9, etc.), police patrol units generally share the same capabilities. Frequently, 
such calls for service require two or more units; however, police incidents typically 
involve few units and require no command or control structure.  
2. Fire Dispatching 
9-1-1 calls for the fire department are nearly all are for ongoing emergencies.41 
This in turn means that “holding” of “stacking” calls is rarely if ever utilized in fire 
dispatching, and calls that require searching a database or making a simple report are 
scarce.42 Due to the emergent nature of these calls, the National Fire Protection 
Administration (NFPA) has set a national standard for 9-1-1 call processing:  
• 90 percent of all emergency calls must be processed within 60 seconds or 
less 
• 99 percent of all emergency calls must be processed within 90 seconds or 
less.43  
If a unit serving a certain geographic district is unavailable, there is no hesitation in 
assigning the emergency to another available unit with the same capabilities. 
Unlike police departments, where patrol units have the same basic capabilities and 
thus can be assigned to incidents interchangeably, fire departments have different 
41 Ibid., 15. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Robert Upson and Kathy Notarianni, “Quantitative Evaluation of Fire and EMS Mobilization,” Fire 




                                                 
apparatus with different capabilities.44 While the terms “fire engine” and “fire truck” are 
ubiquitous and interchangeable in popular culture, engine companies and truck 
companies have very different capabilities. The former is the only apparatus that carries 
water and a pump, and the latter has a wide assortment of tools and skills absent in the 
former. Many departments have other specialized apparatus—tankers, rescue units, aid 
cars, paramedic engines and paramedic units, each with its own unique set of capabilities. 
Thus, assigning and re-assigning units is not as simple a proposition as it is with law 
enforcement units. Additionally, if a fire unit (or units) is out of service for an extended 
period of time, another fire unit may be “moved-up” to that station to maintain 
jurisdiction-wide coverage. 
In contrast to law enforcement incidents, which characteristically involve few 
units and are short in duration, fires and other emergencies can generate a large number 
of units of different types and can last for hours. Deciding which combination of units is 
needed for a response is a key component of fire dispatch.45 Fire departments also make 
use of the NIMS Incident Command System (ICS) on significant alarms—each incident 
has a command structure and functional responsibilities that must be taken into account 
during communications. Pivetta explains, “Often during a large fire, dispatch will split 
the frequencies and handle multiple requests from the fire scene to send additional units, 
support units or handle a variety of other tasks.”46 This makes for a much more 
structured communications process that creates a radio dynamic unlike law 
enforcement.47  
Another factor affecting fire communications is that firefighters are often working 
in environments with immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH) atmospheres, such 
as fires and hazardous materials incidents. This requires personal protective equipment be 
worn, including self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA). The protective equipment, in 
44 Pivetta, 911 Emergency Communications Manual, 167. 
45 Ibid., 162. 
46 Ibid., 15. 
47 Ibid., 178. 
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conjunction with the noisy environment of the fireground due to apparatus, use of hand 
tools, and physical exertion, make radio transmissions difficult to understand. 
Since firefighters typically do not place units on patrol as do law enforcement 
agencies, the day-to-day operations of fire radio are not as busy as police radio—there are 
few requests from fire units that require effort or information from the dispatcher. 
However, when operating at a fire, the radio position must carefully listen to all 
transmissions, which are numerous: firefighter to firefighter, division to command, 
command to dispatch. Any one of these could be a firefighter in trouble, which must be 
acknowledged. Pivetta notes, “A fire call demands full, all-out attention by every person 
involved until the call is ended—and past—when the danger is abated. A fire incident 
takes much focused dispatch power.”48 
Mutual aid, or units from one jurisdiction responding to another due to resource 
needs, either for the incident size or unit unavailability,49 is a regular facet of many fire 
departments’ operations. Interoperability of equipment, tactics, communications and 
command structure is key in these interactions. In 2012 alone, there were 1,326,500 fire 
incidents requiring the dispatch of units from other jurisdictions.50  
3. EMS Dispatching 
Like emergency calls for fire, the almost all 9-1-1 calls for EMS are for an 
ongoing emergency.51 Usually, EMS responses consist of one or two units and require 
either a basic life support (BLS) response or an advanced life support (ALS) response. 
ALS events are generally considered those situations in which a patient could die without 
pre-hospital care.52 These include: cardiac events and shock, for example, as opposed to 
a broken arm, which would be a BLS response. Typically, BLS responders have 
48 Ibid., 161. 
49 Ibid., 185. 
50 Michael Karter, “Fire Loss in the United States During 2012,” National Fire Protection Agency 
Association, September 2013, 
http://www.nfpa.org/~/media/FD0144A044C84FC5BAF90C05C04890B7.ashx, 24. 
51 Ibid., 240. 
52 Ibid., 201. 
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emergency medical technician (EMT) or first responder certification, while ALS 
responders are certified paramedics.53 Those certified members may respond on 
dedicated EMS units, a fire apparatus or, in some cases, a police unit.54 However, the 
most common delivery method for EMS delivery nationwide is fire departments. 
According to Franklin et al.,  
Of the 200 largest cities in the United States, 97% have fire service-based 
pre-hospital 9-1-1 emergency medical response and the fire service 
provides advanced life support (ALS) response and care in 90% of the 30 
most populated U.S. jurisdictions (cities and counties).55 
Emergency medical dispatching is typically provided by an emergency medical 
dispatcher (EMD), who is trained to take 9-1-1 calls and triage the problem through a set 
of pre-determined questions (often called protocols) to determine the level of response 
necessary. A key component is of these calls is pre-arrival instructions, which are self-
care instructions for the caller to initiate prior to the arrival of responders.56 Such 
instructions ensure that aid, such as cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR) or childbirth 
instructions, begins as soon as possible to increase positive patient outcomes. 
Unlike police units, EMS units do not patrol the city actively seeking out 
incidents, and unlike fire incidents, EMS events are generally short in duration. EMS 
workers do not work in an environment as dangerous as either law enforcement or the 
fire service, and thus the radio demands of EMS dispatching are generally not as active as 
law enforcement or fire radio.57  Table 1 illustrates the general differences between 
dispatching disciplines, relative to each other.  
 
 
53 Ibid., 189. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Franklin Pratt et al., Prehospital 9-1-1 Emergency Medical Response: The Role of the United States 
Fire Service in Delivery and Coordination, International Association of Fire Fighters, 2007, 
https://www.iaff.org/tech/PDF/FB EMS Whitepaper FINAL July 5 2007.pdf, 26. 
56 Pivetta, 911 Emergency Communications Manual, 190. 
57 Ibid., 201. 
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ENFORCEMENT FIRE EMS 
CALL TAKING 
Call volume High Low Low 
Nature of calls Mostly non-emergent Emergent Emergent 
Call-answering standard No Yes Yes 
DISPATCHING 
Incidents held or stacked Yes No No 
Reports taken Yes No No 
Database Search Yes No No 
Unit generation of incidents 
from the field Yes Rare Rare 
Unit specialization No Yes Some 
Responses involving a large 
number of units Rare Yes No 
RADIO 
Volume of traffic High 
Low generally, 




transmissions Frequent Low Low 
Generation of incidents from 
field units Yes Rare Rare 
Use of ICS Rare Yes Rare 
Multiple frequencies at incidents Rare Yes Rare 
PPE affects transmissions No Yes No 
Incident length Short Long Short 
Attention intensive incidents Rare Yes No 
 
D. BASIC TERMS 
Several basic terms will be employed repeatedly throughout this thesis. For 
convenience, they are defined in Table 2. 
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Table 2.   Basic terms used in thesis 
TERM DEFINITION 
PSAP dispatch center, 9-1-1 call center 
discipline an area of functional expertise, such as law enforcement, firefighting, or transportation 
agency 
an individual department or organization that practices 
a discipline (e.g., Seattle Fire Department, Snohomish 
County Sheriff or Department of Transportation) 
interoperability 
the ability for different disciplines to coordinate 








Interoperability between different agencies within a 
discipline (e.g., two different fire agencies) 
 
E. PSAP CONSOLIDATION 
The over 8,000 PSAPs in the United States58 are generally small, composed of a 
few workstations, and are associated with a single public safety agency.59 Each of these 
requires physical space, administrative, technological, and personnel resources and a 
large infrastructure that is expensive to purchase, upgrade, and maintain. This, coupled 
with financial constraints caused by almost universal reductions in revenue to state and 
local governments across the United States, has fueled interest in consolidation of these 
smaller PSAPs to avoid duplication of equipment and staff.60 While not a new concept, 
the interest in consolidation appears to have increased over the past five years.61  
In a report issued in 2010, the Communications Security, Reliability and 
Interoperability Council found that  
58 Federal Communications Commission, “PSAP Registry.” 
59 Womack, “Economies of Scale.” 
60 Lovaso, “PSAP Consolidation.”  
61 Raasch, “Recession-battered Cities Combine Services.”  
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in the vast majority of cases, there are clear benefits to consolidation. The 
sharing of resources allows for the elimination of duplicate costs, supports 
coordinated responses, provides greater interoperability, and ultimately 
leads to more effective and efficient service.62  
The typical model for PSAP consolidation is to combine smaller PSAPs primarily 
due to geographic proximity. Most often, this includes multiple law enforcement, fire, 
and EMS PSAPs under one roof in a consolidated, multi-discipline PSAP. However, 
many of these potential savings are not model-dependent. Financial savings resulting 
from reduced office space, reduced/shared personnel resources, economies of scale 
(increased production with fewer inputs), improved and more efficient use of technology 
through shared IT infrastructure, increased purchasing power, and standardization across 
jurisdictions will be achieved regardless if consolidation takes the form of a multi-
discipline PSAP or a single-discipline PSAP. 
However, increasing interoperability and enhancing service levels may well 
depend upon the model of consolidation used. If interoperability between law 
enforcement and fire agencies (inter-discipline interoperability) is less important than 
interoperability among law enforcement and fire agencies (intra-discipline 
interoperability), then interoperability may be better enhanced through consolidation in a 
single-discipline consolidated PSAP than a multi-discipline consolidated PSAP.  
Chapter III explores the prevailing wisdom regarding interoperability and its 
impact on the landscape of communications doctrine. It also provides analysis of the 
benefits and needs for of inter- and intra-discipline interoperability in emergency 




62 Communications Security, Reliability and Interoperability Council, Key Findings, 4. 
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III. COMMUNICATIONS INTEROPERABILITY 
A. PREVAILING WISDOM 
In a capstone paper, Merchant et al. explain: 
During the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attack on the World Trade Center, 
police helicopters circling the scene issued warnings about the possible 
collapse of the tower. However, due to lack of interoperability among the 
radios used by the police and fire departments, hundreds of firefighters 
never received this warning and 343 firefighters lost their lives. In 
contrast, most of the police officers were able to hear the warnings on the 
police frequencies and to escape in time. Thus, their death toll was 
significantly lower.63 
Judging by how often it is cited in the literature, this event has been a driving 
force in developing American strategy in communications interoperability. The National 
Emergency Communications Plan produced by DHS in 2008 describes its vision “to 
ensure emergency response personnel at all levels of government and across all 
disciplines can communicate as needed, on demand, and as authorized, through 
improvements in communications operability, interoperability, and continuity 
nationwide.”64 The Government Accounting Office noted in 2007 that “As the first to 
respond to natural disasters, domestic terrorism, and other emergencies, public safety 
agencies rely on timely communications across multiple disciplines.”65 In a report issued 
in 2003, the National Task Force on Interoperability defines interoperability as:  
the ability of public safety service and support providers—law 
enforcement, firefighters, EMS, emergency management, the public 
utilities, transportation, and others—to communicate with staff from other 
responding agencies, to exchange voice and/or data communication on 
demand and in real time.66  
63 Ronak Merchant et al., “The Lack of Interoperability in the 911 Emergency Communications 
System in Colorado: What Solutions Exist?” Capstone, University of Colorado, 2011, 2.  
64 Department of Homeland Security, National Emergency Communications Plan, 2. 
65 Government Accounting Office, Much Work Remains to Improve Communications Interoperability 
(GAO-07-301) (Washington, DC: Government Accounting Office, 2007).  
66 National Task Force on Interoperability, Why Can’t We Talk? Working Together To Bridge the 
Communications Gap To Save Lives (Washington, DC: National Task Force on Interoperability, 2003). 
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These sentiments are echoed in many other state and organizational interoperability 
plans: the necessity of police, fire, EMS and other governmental response agencies’ 
ability to communicate directly with each other via radio. 
Since 9/11, homeland security efforts have focused upon interoperable radio 
communications for local emergency responders of different disciplines; it the primary 
focus for those seeking grant funding.67 The framework for this solution to 
communications interoperability is technical: “Once disparate radios are connected, 
communications will be facilitated.”68 Figure 1 depicts this prevailing wisdom on 
interoperable communications.  
67 Timmons, “Radio Interoperability,” 77. 
68 Ibid. 
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Figure 1.  This pamphlet on interoperability, designed to inform public officials, 
typifies the prevailing wisdom on the subject69 
B. PROBLEMS WITH THE PREVAILING WISDOM 
The National Task Force on Interoperability discusses the importance of 
communications in a report from 2003: 
The terrorist attack on the Pentagon demonstrates in a very public way 
how critically important communications capabilities are for public safety 
agencies. Imagine the challenge of 50 different local, State and Federal 
public safety agencies responding at the Pentagon—900 different radio 
69 National Association of Counties, When They Can’t Talk Lives are Lost [pamphlet], 2003, 
http://www.region49.org/txrc/files/When_They_Can’t_Talk_Brochure_10-09-08.pdf 
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users, operating on multiple radio systems, and attempting to 
communicate with each other.70 
The above quote, by a member of the National Task Force on Interoperability, 
perhaps best sums up the prevailing wisdom on communications interoperability. 
However, treating communications interoperability as a mere technological problem may 
actually make matters worse, not better.71 The assumption that interoperability will be 
enhanced by direct communications between responders of different disciplines ignores 
four aspects of large emergency incidents: 
• Communications system overload 
• Cognitive overload among responders 
• Uniqueness of disciplines 
• Organizational knowledge 
1. General Communications Overload 
The corollary response to the quote in the previous section by the National Task 
Force on Interoperability is to imagine the challenge of 50 different local, state and 
federal public safety agencies responding at the Pentagon—900 different radio users, 
operating on the same radio system, and attempting to communicate with each other. A 
characteristic of large-scale multi-jurisdictional or multi-disciplinary incidents is an 
overload of the communications system. The nature of such events and the sheer number 
of responders attempting to transmit messages cause the system to become ineffective. 
As Timmons succinctly states, “Radio spectrum is a limited commodity—once it’s full, 
it’s full.”72 Adding more users to a saturated system in an effort to improve 
communications only compounds the problem. 
2. Cognitive Overload  
Communications overload isn’t limited to the system’s capacity or bandwidth; it 
also overloads the users of that system. Radio transmissions are designed to increase 
70 National Task Force on Interoperability, Why Can’t We Talk?, 10. 
71 Timmons, “Radio Interoperability,” 77. 
72 Ibid. 
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situational awareness, providing critical clues and cues that expand understanding of an 
incident. However, too many transmissions, or transmissions that do not serve the 
interests of responders can create a kind of cognitive noise that has the opposite effect. 
Essentially, human cognition is limited with respect to the amount of information it can 
hold, and the number of operations it can perform based on that information—at a certain 
point, the cognitive load of performing a certain task (such as listening to the radio while 
operating at an incident) becomes a hindrance to performance.73   
This is also noted by the International Association of Fire Chiefs, 
A frequent contributing factor in firefighter casualties is too much radio 
traffic. This can have a significant impact on situational awareness 
because it becomes nearly impossible to take in, comprehend, process and 
remember the volume of information being transmitted over the radio 
when communications aren’t disciplined.74 
3. Uniqueness of Disciplines 
The government has several obligations to the public it serves: provide protection 
from crime, assist in fire and rescue events, treat the sick and injured, provide utility 
service—the list is extensive. Because these services are unique (as is the knowledge, 
skills and equipment required to provide them), government provides discrete 
departments to provide these services.  
This distinctiveness of the disciplines does not change when operating at an 
incident together. While all agencies at an incident are working together for a common 
goal, they are generally working on different aspects of that incident related to their 
unique mission. For example, a car crash into a utility pole may generate a response by 
police, fire, ambulance and utility agencies. While all four agencies have a role in the 
incident, those roles are largely unrelated: police will control traffic and investigate the 
cause of the accident, fire will extricate the victim and extinguish any fire present, the 
ambulance unit will treat and transport the victim, and utilities personnel will secure and 
73 Fred Pass et al., “Cognitive Load Measurement as a Means to Advance Cognitive Load Theory,” 
Educational Psychologist 38, no. 2, 2003, 64.  
74 International Association of Fire Chiefs, “Firefighter/EMT Safety, Health and Survival: Radio 
Discipline,” accessed August 12, 2014, http://www.iafc.org/onScene/article.cfm?ItemNumber=7079 
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restore electricity. While all responders are working together to achieve the goals of the 
incident, they are not working together on any one task—their cooperation is more akin 
to a mosaic than a melting pot. Each has its function to perform, which must be 
coordinated. However, in the actual performance of their tasks, each discipline largely 
operates separately. Other than being told when to begin and end traffic control, for 
example, the police will be operating independently from the other disciplines—their 
performance of that duty requires little communication with the other entities on scene. 
The overall incident is essentially four incidents in one: a police incident, a fire incident, 
a utilities incident, and an EMS incident. While the various functions must be 
coordinated at a strategic level, at the task level the function of each discipline is largely 
distinct. 
One of the recommendations of the National Incident Management System is that 
“during incident response activities, radio traffic should be restricted to those messages 
necessary for the effective execution of emergency management/response personnel 
tasks.”75 Communication unrelated to a responder tasks is superfluous and provides no 
benefit or situational awareness to a responder receiving such a message and serves only 
to reduce air time on the radio. Given that the tasks for each discipline are disparate, it 
would follow that communications regarding those tasks also be separate. There is no 
benefit at the task level to hearing transmissions unrelated to the task at hand. There is 
value to such information of the strategic level of communication to enable coordination 
of the different tasks to the overall incident objectives, but that advantage is realized at 
the command level, not the task level. 
4. Organizational Knowledge 
Unit-to-unit communications between disciplines at a large incident are fraught 
with difficulties. Reasons cited for the necessity of such communications include 
requesting action or to warn of impending danger. Organizational differences make such 
communications largely impractical. This is in part because requesting action requires 
75 Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], National Incident Management System 
(Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2008), 28. 
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organizational knowledge that one discipline may not possess about another. Consider a 
police unit working at a large incident with a fire department. The police unit notices a 
previously unnoticed fire in a building and wants to request that a fire unit, which he sees 
300 feet away, to extinguish it. While the request is appropriate and makes sense in the 
abstract, in practice there are barriers to this to this course of action: 
• Notification—Although he can see the fire unit he wants to contact, the 
police officer has no idea what the unit’s radio signature is. Simply put, a 
radio signature is the name of the unit; without knowing this information, 
it is impossible to address this unit in particular via radio. Simply seeing 
an apparatus does not provide a unit signature. 
• Capability—Members of one discipline do not have the expertise to know 
the quantity and type of units required to handle emergencies from another 
discipline. The police officer may have no idea of the capability of the fire 
unit he sees—it may be a ladder company, which carries no water and has 
no ability to actually extinguish fires.  
• Command and control—The unit the police officer is trying to assign may 
already be performing a critical assignment for the incident commander, 
or the crew may already be committed to a task in which disengagement 
will take some time, essentially rendering the unit unavailable.  
C. EXAMPLES OF DIFFICULTIES RELATING TO COMMUNICATIONS 
INTEROPERABILITY AT LARGE SCALE INCIDENTS 
An examination of several large-scale incidents since 9/11 illustrates some of the 
communications interoperability concepts outlined above. 
1. 9/11 Pentagon Response 
Robert E. Lee, Public Safety Wireless Network Program Manager, is quoted in 
Why Can’t We Talk? Working Together To Bridge the Communications Gap To Save 
Lives as stating: 
The Pentagon report found that the majority of local public safety 
responders at the scene experienced little difficulty establishing 
interoperable communications during the initial response. Due to existing 
mutual aid agreements, most of the first responders had [common] radio 
frequencies pre-programmed into their portable radio equipment and had 
frequently used the capability for other mutual aid responses.76 
76 National Task Force on Interoperability, Why Can’t We Talk?, 10. 
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While grounded in truth, the quote does not paint the full picture of radio 
communications as described in the After Action Report on the Response to the 
September 11 Terrorist Attack on the Pentagon, issued in 2002. Communications at the 
Pentagon on 9/11 were not initially a success. Because initial radio communications were 
overloaded and ineffective, two firefighters were sent on foot to record the location and 
name of every piece of equipment on the Pentagon grounds. According to the after action 
report, “in the first few hours, foot messengers at times proved to be the most reliable 
means of communicating.”77 
By September 12, the Incident Command Operations Section organized the fire 
suppression units into four divisions, each led by a chief officer from a lead jurisdiction 
(Division A—Arlington, Division B—the District of Columbia, Division C—Alexandria, 
and Division D—Fairfax). Each division used the assigned lead jurisdiction’s radio 
channel for communicating, which facilitated communications by separating the radio 
traffic into four different channels, each tied to a geographic location.78 EMS responders 
were also located on a different functional channel. 
Law enforcement used a similar strategy to facilitate communications. A network, 
separate from the fire operations network, was established. Using 5 of the 14 available 
radio channels, the police network was divided into channels not by geography, but by 
function. Each law enforcement function (i.e., evidence recovery, perimeter security, 
motors, and special weapons and tactics) had a dedicated channel. The function sectors 
shared a common command channel, which was reserved for the command staff of each 
function. “Once radio discipline was restored and the initial volume of traffic subsided, 
the ACPD radio system worked well.”79 
There were many successes on 9/11 at the Pentagon; however, communications 
interoperability dependent on agencies of different disciplines being able to contact each 
other via radio was not one of them. Communications were aided by the separation of 
77 Titan Systems Corporation, After Action Report, A-10. 
78 Ibid., A-37. 
79 Ibid., C-17. 
 30 
                                                 
police and fire communications; in fact, only the fire groups that were actively working 
together were kept on the same channel. Even within the same discipline, unit-to-unit 
communications were not seen as necessary if they were not operating on the same task. 
This separation of communication geographically, functionally, and by discipline 
contributed to the success of the operation to the extent that the after action report 
suggests expanding pre-planning radio separation by function: “Radio channel and talk 
group allocation for fire and rescue command, operations, and logistics functions should 
be preplanned, established early, and clearly communicated.”80 
2. 1997 New Hampshire Manhunt 
In 1997, an armed fugitive in New Hampshire responsible for the deaths of two 
law enforcement officers, a judge, and a newspaper editor stole a police car, retrieved 
additional ammunition and altered his appearance. Local, county, state, and federal law 
officials were mobilized in the effort to apprehend this fugitive. A series of radio 
communications failures were attributed to technology—incompatible radio systems and 
poor reception. However, one trooper commented, “There was so much (radio) traffic 
because of the police responding (to the scene) that I couldn’t get air time to talk to our 
dispatcher. So I gave up trying to communicate with anybody at [that] point.”81 Even 
though all responders were from the same discipline (law enforcement), the sheer number 
of transmissions rendered communications ineffective. Had perfect interoperability in 
terms of unit-to-unit capability been present, the problem could only have been worse, as 
the number of transmissions already paralyzing the system would only have increased. 
3. 9/11 World Trade Center Response 
In the anecdote that opens this chapter, the failure of Fire Department of New 
York (FDNY) to receive transmissions from New York Police Department (NYPD) 
helicopter pilots who were warming of possible collapse contributed to disaster:  
80 Ibid., A-38. 
81 Donald A. Lund, The Lessons of Non-Interoperability in Public Safety Communication Systems 
(Durham, NH: University of New Hampshire, 2002).   
 31 
                                                 
hundreds of firefighters never received this warning and 343 firefighters 
lost their lives. In contrast, most of the police officers were able to hear the 
warnings on the police frequencies and to escape in time. Thus, their death 
toll was significantly lower.82  
This statement is disingenuous; it completely ignores the facts that the FDNY manpower 
commitment to interior operations dwarfed NYPD’s, as well as the fact the South Tower 
had already collapsed, killing 222 FDNY members.83 Far from demonstrating that all 
responders being on a single channel would have prevented the deaths, it also fails to take 
into account other communications facts regarding the incident. 
The FDNY’s radios performed poorly during at World Trade Center at both 1993 
and 2001 incidents for two reasons: first, numerous steel and concrete floors that affected 
signal penetration; and second, so many different companies were attempting to use the 
same point-to-point channel that communications became unintelligible.84 Adding all 
police communications onto the same channel as the FDNY would only have saturated 
the system more. The differences in police and fire communications were outlined in the 
9/11 Commission Report, published in 2004: 
The success of NYPD ESU instruction is attributable to a combination of 
(1) the strength of the radios, (2) the relatively small numbers of 
individuals using them, and (3) use of the correct channel by all. The same 
three factors worked against successful communication among FDNY 
personnel. First, the radios’ effectiveness was drastically reduced in the 
high-rise environment. Second, tactical channel 1 was simply 
overwhelmed by the number of units attempting to communicate on it at 
10:00. Third, some firefighters were on the wrong channel or simply 
lacked radios altogether.85 
Again, these problems would not have been solved or have been exacerbated if all 
responders had been on a single radio system. 
82 Merchant, “The Lack of Interoperability,” 2.   
83 “9/11 Exposed Deadly Flaws in Rescue Plan,” New York Times, July 7, 2002, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/07/nyregion/07EMER.html  
84 9/11 Commission, The Final Report of the National Commission, 283. 
85 Ibid., 322. 
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D. COMMUNICATIONS INTEROPERABILITY SOLUTIONS  
Based on the examples above, the prevailing wisdom of curing interoperability by 
enabling all radios to have direct communication across all disciplines is not the answer. 
In each example, the quantity of transmissions saturated the communications systems—
adding more transmissions to the system would only serve to intensify the problem. If 
technology in and of itself is not the solution, what is? 
1. Who Needs to Talk? 
Communications issues outlined in the preceding examples demonstrate that not 
every responder needs to be able to talk every other responder at an incident involving 
multiple agencies. While command and control needs to be exercised over all units, only 
those units actively working together on the same task need to be in direct 
communication. Typically, this involves units from the same discipline—units fighting a 
fire together, for example, regardless of jurisdiction or agency, need to be in contact, as 
may law enforcement agents attempting to secure a perimeter.  
Even this may not apply in larger incidents—at the Pentagon on 9/11, fire units 
involved in suppression activities that were remote from each other were on separate 
channels to facilitate communications. However, law enforcement at the Pentagon, even 
though embroiled in the same incident as the various fire departments, had completely 
different objectives, and did not need to monitor or communicate on fire channels in 
order to function effectively. The units involved in the manhunt in New Hampshire, even 
though they were all law enforcement agencies, may have benefitted from geographic 
parsing of channels; interoperability clearly was not aided by the radio saturation they 
experienced.  
2. Organizational Aids to Interoperability 
Regardless of discipline, few would argue that a large incident with multiple 
jurisdictions and agencies operating together requires communications capability in place 
to ensure that all participants may be informed enough to coordinate and accomplish the 
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overall strategy. The state of Connecticut recognizes this in its plan for communications 
interoperability, in which three strategies are identified: 
• Interoperability at the functional level 
• Infrastructure improvements  
• Interoperability at the incident/unified command level86  
a. Interoperability at the Functional Level 
Agencies in the same discipline must be able to operate functionally in 
conjunction with one another. Complex incidents such as 9/11, hurricanes, and other 
large events have demonstrated that such events are likely to cross jurisdictional 
boundaries. 
The jurisdictions around Arlington prior to the 9/11 Pentagon incident have fully 
acknowledged this interdependence with their mutual aid agreements. The regional fire 
departments had automatic mutual aid agreements, to the point of “sharing battalion 
chiefs across the lines on first-alarm assignments,” according to one local chief.87 This 
familiarity of operations and systems meant that the various fire jurisdictions operated as 
well at the Pentagon as they did at more routine incidents, with the exception of the 
District of Columbia Fire Department (DCFD), which lacked previous experience or 
mutual aid agreements with the other responders. Consequently, DCFD’s efforts were not 
as well coordinated as the other responding agencies, who exercised interoperability 
regularly prior to 9/11.88 Mutual aid agreements also facilitated law enforcement 
collaboration among 300 officers from 17 jurisdictions.89 The interagency bond was 
evident even where no formal understanding existed. Defense Protective Services (DPS) 
and Arlington County Police had no mutual aid agreement. However, the shared 
experience of interacting during large-scale events, such as the Marine Corps Marathon, 
86 State of Connecticut, “Plan for Enhanced Public Safety Communications Interoperability,” 
February 2004, http://www.ct.gov/oem/lib/oem/docsuploaded/interop_minutes/comm_interop_plan_-
_final.pdf 
87 Pam Weiger, “Pentagon Report: Arlington County Starts Implementing Changes Urged in 9/11 
Report,” NFPA Journal, November/December 2002, 
http://www.nfpa.org/assets/files/MbrSecurePDF/Journal1102Pentagon.pdf, 38.  
88Ibid., 39. 
89 Titan Systems Corporation, After Action Report, C-21. 
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helped facilitate coordination and communications between the two organizations and 
enabled the evacuation of the Pentagon to go smoothly.90 Previous work together 
provided “instant trust among emergency response agencies” according to Chief Jester of 
the DPS.91 Building functional interoperability between agencies during routine events 
enhances operational interoperability at larger, more complex events.  
b. Infrastructure Improvements 
As discussed above, different agencies within a given discipline in a geographical 
proximity must have the ability to communicate unit-to-unit, as they will often be 
coordinating on the same task. This includes not only voice, but also increasingly data, 
especially in the case of law enforcement agencies. This is not to say that the ability to 
communicate unit-to-unit across disciplines (i.e., police to fire) is a useless capability. 
Even though it does not appear to be as important in large events, there may be rare 
occasions when it is necessary or desirable—when different disciplines are operating on 
the same task, for instance. However, circumstances in which multiple disciplines are 
operating jointly on the same task are considerably rarer than such cooperation among the 
same discipline. 
c. Interoperability at the Incident/Unified Command Level 
Interoperability at the command and control level was recognized to be the first 
priority in the state of Connecticut’s plan.92 Perhaps the greatest tool for inter-
disciplinary interoperability is the Incident Command System (ICS). The National 
Incident Management System (NIMS), adopted by all federal agencies and those agencies 
wishing to receive DHS funding, provides such a tool through the concept of unified 
command (UC). NIMS defines unified command as:  
An Incident Command System application used when more than one 
agency has incident jurisdiction or when incidents cross political 
jurisdictions. Agencies work together through the designated members of 
90 Ibid., C-9. 
91 Ibid., C-32. 
92 State of Connecticut, “Plan for Enhanced Public Safety Communications Interoperability.” 
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the UC, often the senior persons from agencies and/or disciplines 
participating in the UC, to establish a common set of objectives and 
strategies and a single Incident Action Plan.93 
By having representatives from all disciplines and jurisdictions at a single 
location (the command post), requests for inter-disciplinary actions can be arranged in 
conjunction with the incident strategy. For example, if a fire unit requires police for 
crowd control, rather than contact a police unit directly, it can contact the incident 
commander (IC), who can pass the request to the law enforcement representative at the 
command post. This law enforcement representative will be better able to locate and 
communicate with the appropriate law enforcement unit(s) whom can best provide this. 
At the Pentagon on 9/11, incident command was established onsite within minutes 
of the attack and its authority was never challenged.94 As a unified command, all major 
stakeholders were present at the command post to ensure that the needs of each 
jurisdiction and discipline were taken into account in the decision-making process, and 
their efforts could be coordinated.95 Though communications were on separate channels 
according to geography and function, the unified command enabled all stakeholders to be 
informed and updated on all facets of the incident and acted as a communications 
clearinghouse. This enabled the Arlington County Fire Department to retain primacy 
during the rescue/suppression phase of the incident, the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) to assume command for the investigation phase on September 21, and the 
Department of Defense to take over on September 28.  
This contrasts sharply with the World Trade Center in which the FDNY and 
NYPD had separate command structures, separate command posts, and little information 
sharing or interaction between the two.96 As stated in a public hearing following 9/11, 
The NYPD and the FDNY were two of the preeminent emergency 
response organizations in the United States. But each considered itself 
93 FEMA, National Incident Management System, 149. 
94 Titan Systems Corporation, After Action Report, A-13. 
95 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “NIMS and the Incident Command System,” accessed 
June 21, 2013, http://www.fema.gov/txt/nims/nims_ics_position_paper.txt  
96 Titan Systems Corporation, After Action Report, 319–323. 
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operationally autonomous. Each was accustomed to responding 
independently to emergencies. By September 11th neither had 
demonstrated the readiness to respond to an ‘Incident Commander’ if that 
commander was an official outside of their Department.97 
That said, unified command would not have aided the situation delineated in the 
helicopter anecdote that opens this chapter, as the FDNY command post was obliterated 
in the collapse of the South Tower; however, this was a singular event. It is difficult to 
argue that collaboration would not have been helped by co-location of FDNY, NYPD and 
the Port Authority Police Department (PAPD) in a unified command post. For example, 
the FDNY, PAPD, and NYPD did not coordinate searches of the World Trade Center, 
resulting redundant searches of certain floors and areas.98 
Isolating the disciplines, their tasks, and their communications at a large or 
complex incident is not a failure of interoperability, but rather an enhancement of it. The 
after action report for the 9/11 Pentagon response stated that the “ACPD should 
recommend, in incidents not commanded by law enforcement organizations, a Law 
Enforcement Branch be established within the ICS Operations Section.”99 By separating 
the activities and communications of each discipline, organization and communications at 
an incident are enriched. 
E. COMMUNICATIONS INTEROPERABILITY AND PSAPS  
The cases and interoperability analysis discussed above suggests the following 
characteristics of interoperability: 
• Intra-discipline unit-to-unit communication capabilities are important at 
all incidents, regardless of scope. Because these units may be performing 
operational tasks together, the ability to coordinate and communicate at 
the tactical and task levels is crucial. Because they are within the same 
discipline, the units share organizational understanding and possess 
similar knowledge, skills, abilities that will be applied to the same 
objectives. Communications will all be germane to the objectives at hand 
97 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, “National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Eleventh Public Hearing,” May 18, 2004, http://www.9-
11commission.gov/archive/hearing11/9-11Commission_Hearing_2004-05-18.htm 
98 9/11 Commission, The Final Report of the National Commission, 321. 
99 Titan Systems Corporation, After Action Report, C-19. 
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and would not cause cognitive overload if proper discipline is maintained. 
The possibility can be mitigated by radio separation by geography or 
function, as demonstrated by the response to the Pentagon on 9/11. 
• Inter-discipline unit-to-unit communications are less important. Because 
the uniqueness of disciplines, even though they are operating at the same 
incident, each discipline would likely be concentrating on tasks and tactics 
that are unrelated to each other. Organizational knowledge likely 
precludes meaningful dialogue, and the different objectives will result in 
transmissions that will be of no use to many responders, increasing the 
possibility for cognitive overload. Consequently, inter-discipline 
communications are rarely needed and may in fact be counterproductive. 
• Intra-discipline functional interoperability is crucial at all incidents. Again, 
working on the same tasks and objectives requires cooperation and 
coordination. Building functional interoperability between agencies during 
routine events enhances operational interoperability at larger, more 
complex events.  
• Inter-disciplinary interoperability is best helped at large or complex 
incidents via unified command, where information regarding each 
discipline’s role can be addressed by the stakeholder of that discipline. 
Even though the ultimate goal of all responders at a large scale incident is 
the same, different disciplines will pursue different objectives through 
separate tactics and tasks. Since tactics and tasks are completed at the unit 
level, interoperability between disciplines will not be facilitated by unit-to-
unit voice communications—the strategic level is where different 
disciplines will have their activities coordinated with the overall incident 
action plan. 
The PSAP’s role in interoperability can be viewed through this framework. As 
noted in Chapter II, the function of the PSAP is not only to receive 9-1-1 calls for 
assistance; PSAPs also: 
• Serve as the hub for all communications activities of each of the agencies 
they serve 
• Track unit status and location 
• Ensure that jurisdictions maintain adequate protection through distribution 
of units 
• Monitor radio communications of ongoing incidents 
Given these missions that all revolve around command, control, and coordination, 
which category of PSAP provides the opportunity for the greatest interoperability 
benefits: a single agency PSAP, a consolidated multi-discipline PSAP, or a consolidated 
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single-discipline PSAP? An examination of a hypothetical PSAP structure in a fictional 
county may prove useful in examining this question.  
1. Parameters 
This exercise will begin with the following assumptions: 
• An imaginary county with multiple jurisdictions 
• The county, in line with FCC best practices, will have at least two PSAPs, 
each of which will act as a back-up facility for the other 
• The county is home to 20 fire departments and 20 law enforcement 
agencies 
• Technology such as CAD and radio systems in each PSAP has been 
leveraged for peak interoperability  
a. Single Agency PSAP 
A single agency PSAP dispatches for a single fire or law enforcement agency. 
Single agency PSAPs are typically small in size and make up the majority of PSAPs in 
the United States.100 By definition a single-discipline PSAP, as a single agency PSAP 
will have knowledge of all unit locations and status for its agency, direct control of all 
communications for the agency, and monitor all incidents for this agency. It will also 
maintain jurisdictional coverage of units for this agency. 
If mutual aid is needed by the agency represented by the PSAP, whether for a 
routine incident or a complex one, it will need to be requested and coordinated with 
another PSAP. Doing so may necessitate “patching” of radio channels to facilitate 
communications. The single agency PSAP will not know the availability, location or 
capabilities of the mutual aid units until given that information by the PSAP it is 
coordinating with, nor will it likely be able to track those units in its own CAD system. 
These issues will be reversed if mutual aid is requested from the single agency 
PSAP for an incident outside of its jurisdiction. The single agency PSAP will need to 
coordinate with the requesting PSAP to enable a response, and the radios may or may not 
100 Womack, “Economies of Scale,” 1.  
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be interoperable. These issues will confront the single agency PSAP regardless of 
whether it interacts with an agency that represents the same discipline or not. 
Since single agency PSAPs are typically small in size, it will be a strain on 
staffing to monitor the additional responsibilities in tracking and communicating with 
units that larger incidents will require. Essentially, single agency PSAPs offer no 
enhancement to either intra- or inter-discipline interoperability. This is exchanged for 
another positive effect highly valued by agencies: control: the main advantage to a single 
agency PSAP is that it is under complete local control—that is, the PSAP’s policies and 
procedures reflect exactly what the agency want the PSAP to reflect. When consolidation 
occurs, there is a governance structure that attempts to unify the policies and practices of 
the PSAP, which may not dovetail well with all agencies’ practices. 
b. Consolidated Multi-discipline PSAP 
Given the parameters of the exercise, we can presume there are two PSAPs in the 
county, both of which are multi-discipline, each serving 10 law enforcement and 10 fire 
agencies. Each PSAP would serve as the back-up facility for the other. Each PSAP would 
increase communications interoperability for each of the 10 agencies in each discipline—
all of the fire agencies would use the same radios, alerting system and standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) for dispatch. Likewise, each of the 10 law enforcement agencies 
would receive the same benefits, including data interoperability. 
Both disciplines would also gain the benefit of all of their units being tracked for 
status, location, and capability in CAD. Any specialty unit needed by one agency that 
was operated by the other (a SWAT or hazmat team, for example) would have one point 
of contact for utilization. Other mutual aid responses between the agencies at that PSAP 
would similarly be facilitated. Only when the mutual aid was needed from an agency at 
the other PSAP would the problems facing the single agency PSAP arise. 
Each PSAP would also gain some measure of interoperability between its police 
and fire agencies; however, as noted above, on routine calls such interoperability is 
typically handled face-to-face, and at larger incidents through ICS. Rare though the cases 
may be, this interoperability must still be considered a benefit. 
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c. Consolidated Single-discipline PSAP 
Given the parameters of the exercise, we can again presume there are two PSAPs 
in the county, both of which are single-discipline. The first is a law enforcement PSAP, 
which serves all 20 of the law enforcement agencies in the county. The other is a 
fire/EMS PSAP, which serves the 20 fire departments in the county. The fire PSAP 
would be a secondary PSAP. All 9-1-1 calls for the county would first go to the law 
enforcement PSAP, and be transferred to the fire PSAP if related to a fire or medical 
emergency.101  
The intra-disciplinary interoperability benefits would be the same as for the multi-
discipline PSAP, except that the benefits would be countywide, for both routine and large 
scale, complex events. Every fire department in the county could share the same 
resources, including regional assets. Every fire communication and unit would be 
monitored and tracked by the same entity. A large or complex incident happening in the 
county, with the right governance, could operate as one large regional fire department. 
The same benefits would be present at the law enforcement PSAP. 
Though there are intra-disciplinary benefits, no significant strides would be made 
in inter-discipline interoperability (see Table 3). The primary/secondary PSAP concept 








101 Law enforcement PSAPs, due to staffing requirements, are more qualified to serve as primary 
PSAPs than fire PSAPs 
 41 
                                                 















or Fire only) 
Intra-discipline Communications SOPs (Fire to 
Police/Police to Fire) LOW IMPROVED REGIONAL 
Inter-discipline Unit-to-Unit Communications 
(Fire to Police/Police to Fire) LOW IMPROVED LOW 
Intra-discipline Unit-to-Unit Communications  
(Fire to Fire/Police to Police) LOW IMPROVED REGIONAL 
Inter-discipline Unit Status, Tracking and Locating 
in CAD LOW IMPROVED LOW 
Intra-discipline Unit Status, Tracking and Locating 
in CAD  LOW IMPROVED REGIONAL 
 
Table 3 shows that while all aspects of interoperability are strengthened in the 
multi-discipline PSAP, they are not augmented to a regional level. The single-discipline 
PSAP, by contrast, does not offer enhancements to inter-discipline interoperability. 
However, the effects of intra-disciplinary interoperability (highlighted in yellow on Table 
3) are amplified to the regional cooperation level. As noted, intra-discipline 
interoperability is key. While firefighters and law enforcement agencies have a common 
desirable outcome in mitigating large or complex incidents, they have different 
objectives, tasks, and tactics in which they rarely operate together. Inter-discipline 
interoperability and communication is best when it occurs within ICS via unified 
command. At the unit level, attempts at inter-discipline interoperability can actually make 
communications more difficult, as noted by Ronald Timmons: 
Assumptions made by the misinformed general public, as well as by 
public-sector policy makers, have led to a misguided solution strategy. 
Solution strategies currently being pursued may actually make matters 
worse, instead of better (via overloading systems by patching too many 
users together), despite hundreds of millions of public dollars awarded 
through grant funding to improve communications.102 
102 Timmons, “Radio Interoperability,” 77. 
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This suggests that the PSAPs, which control communications and resource management, 
are better suited to do so as single-discipline entities with the ability to effect 
interoperability on a regional level. 
F. CONCLUSION 
A hypothetical approach is useful in making generalizations about the potential of 
interoperability, and it suggests that true regional response capacity is furthered through 
the separation of PSAPs by discipline. In Chapter IV, case studies of a number of actual 
PSAPs will be undertaken to examine their interoperable capability, to what extent they 
realize that capability relative to inter- and intra-discipline interoperability, and how their 
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IV. INTEROPERABILITY SURVEY OF PSAPS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter III suggested that the current prevailing wisdom regarding 
communications interoperability—that it is desirable for all disciplines at an incident to 
communicate unit-to-unit and member-to-member—is incorrect and may in fact actually 
inhibit incident communications. However, the importance of intra-discipline (law 
enforcement-to-law enforcement and fire-to-fire) communications interoperability, across 
jurisdictional and agency boundaries, is paramount. If true, this would indicate that 
PSAPs, which function as the hub of emergency response communications, should 
combine by discipline when consolidation occurs. 
Chapter IV will examine a national cross-section of actual PSAPs, both single-
discipline (fire or law enforcement only) and multi-discipline (fire and law enforcement), 
to determine the capacity for communications interoperability, how communications 
interoperability is handled operationally, and to what extent that capacity is realized 
relative to discipline. This information was obtained through a survey (see Appendix A) 
sent to nine PSAPs of varying sizes across the United States: 
• Portland (OR) Bureau of Emergency Communications 
• Charleston County (SC) Consolidated 9-1-1 Center 
• Fairfax County (VA) 9-1-1 
• Denver (CO) 911 Emergency Communications 
• Santa Cruz (CA) Regional 9-1-1 
• Seattle (WA) Police Communications 
• Spokane (WA) Combined Communications Center  
• Los Angeles County Fire Department Command and Control 
• Phoenix Fire Department (AZ) Regional Dispatch Center 
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B. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON SURVEYED PSAPS 
PSAPs surveyed varied in size, type, and geographic location, in an effort to 
represent as wide a range of PSAP diversity as possible.  
1. Bureau of Emergency Communications 
Portland’s Bureau of Emergency Communications (BOEC) has existed in some 
consolidated model for nearly 40 years.103 Portland’s BOEC provides 9-1-1 dispatch 
services for all public safety agencies within Multnomah County with the exception of 
the Port of Portland; see Table 4.104 The BOEC is a primary PSAP that employs civilian 
call takers, dispatchers, radio operators and administrators, and it serves five police 
agencies, four fire agencies, and one EMS provider. 
Table 4.   Basic PSAP information: Bureau of Emergency Communications 
 
PSAP PROFILE 
PSAP NAME: Bureau of Emergency Communications 
LOCATION: Portland, OR 
TYPE: Multi-discipline, Primary PSAP 
AGENCIES 
SERVED: CALL VOLUME: 
5 POLICE 284,225 
4 FIRE 80,301 
1 EMS 73,245 
 
All agencies served by BOEC use the same Portland-owned public safety voice 
radio system. Funded in part by a grant through the Department of Homeland Security, 
this system is a key component of a larger, regional effort toward interoperability and 
includes seven countywide 9-1-1 centers.105 Currently, the BOEC shares radio 
interoperability with three adjacent counties.106  
103 Womack, “Economies of Scale,” xix. 
104 Ibid., 74. 
105 Ibid., 90. 
106 Ibid. 
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In addition, the BOEC enjoys a high level of data interoperability among its law 
enforcement agencies. All law enforcement agencies within Multnomah County share the 
same Records Management System (RMS)107 that is completely compatible with their 
CAD system.108 In many ways, the BOEC is an exemplar of the prevailing wisdom of 
interoperability as discussed in Chapter III. 
2. Charleston County Consolidated 9-1-1 Center 
Charleston County Consolidated 911 Center (CCC911) is owned and operated by the 
county of Charleston, South Carolina. It provides 9-1-1 emergency communications services 
for the county and multiple local jurisdictions in the region. CCC911 was established in 
January 2009 and, to date, has consolidated 10 separate dispatch centers: five primary 
PSAPs, one secondary PSAP, and four dispatch-only centers; see Table 5.109 CCC911 
provides all law, fire, and EMS 9-1-1 dispatch services within Charleston County with the 
exception of Folly Beach Public Safety, which operates as a secondary PSAP.110 It is staffed 
and administered by civilians. 






PSAP NAME: Department of Public Safety Communications  
LOCATION: Fairfax County, VA 
TYPE: Multi-discipline, Primary PSAP 
AGENCIES 
SERVED: CALL VOLUME: 
7 POLICE 897,452 
13 FIRE 56,438 






109 Womack, “Economies of Scale,” 49. 
110 “Charleston County Consolidated 9-1-1 Center,” Charleston County South Carolina Online, June 
12, 2014, http://www.charlestoncounty.org/Departments/dispatch/index.htm 
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3. Fairfax County 9-1-1 
Fairfax County 9-1-1 is the largest PSAP in the Commonwealth of Virginia and 
one of the 10 largest in the United States.111 It is a primary PSAP that employs civilians 
in all floor and administrative positions. It dispatches units of the Fairfax County Police 
Department, Fire and Rescue Department, and Sheriff’s Office; see Table 6. In addition 
to Fairfax County, it is the designated 9-1-1 PSAP for the towns of Herndon, Vienna, and 
Fairfax.  
Table 6.   Basic PSAP information: Fairfax County 9-1-1 
 
 
4. Denver 911 Emergency Communications  
Denver 9-1-1’s service area encompasses all of Denver city and county (the 
geographic footprint is one and the same); see Table 7. Emergency calls placed within 
these boundaries are received and then screened to determine if the caller has a police, 
fire, or medical emergency. Police and medical calls for service are processed 
immediately by the 9-1-1 call-taker. All fire related calls are transferred to Denver Fire 
Dispatch,112 making it essentially a secondary PSAP within a PSAP. Denver fire 
dispatchers are sworn firefighters, and Denver Public Health dispatchers are certified 
paramedics. Floor supervisors are a mix of civilian and uniformed personnel. 
111 “About Us,” Fairfax County Virginia, accessed June 12, 2014, 
http://www.fairfaxcounty.gov/911/aboutus.htm 




                                                 
Table 7.   Basic PSAP information: Denver 911 Emergency Communications 
 
 
5. Santa Cruz Regional 9-1-1 
Santa Cruz Regional 9-1-1 (SCR 9-1-1) is located on the north side of Monterey 
Bay. It is a multi-discipline consolidated PSAP that serves 10 fire departments, six law 
enforcement agencies, and two stand-alone EMS agencies; see Table 8. It is the primary 
PSAP for all of Santa Cruz County with the exception of Scotts Valley Police and the 
University of California at Santa Cruz, for whom SCR 9-1-1 acts as a secondary 
PSAP.113 SCR 9-1-1 is an entirely civilian operation. Its 10 fire departments operate as a 
single entity—the closest units are sent to an emergency regardless of jurisdiction. Its law 
enforcement agencies operate together via mutual aid upon request. 
Table 8.   Basic PSAP information: Santa Cruz Regional 9-1-1 
 
PSAP PROFILE 
PSAP NAME: Santa Cruz Regional 9-1-1  
LOCATION: Santa Cruz, CA 
TYPE: Multi-discipline, Primary PSAP 
AGENCIES 
SERVED: CALL VOLUME: 
6 POLICE 326,058 
10 FIRE 29,302 
2 EMS 22,957 
 
 
113 “About Us,” Santa Cruz Regional 9–1-1, accessed July 24, 2014, http://www.scr911.org/ 
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6. Seattle Police Communications 
The Seattle Police 9-1-1 Center is the primary answering point for all police, fire, 
and medical emergency calls within the city limits of Seattle. The center dispatches only 
for the Seattle Police Department; two smaller law enforcement agencies within the city 
limits (Port of Seattle Police and University of Washington Police) have their own 
PSAPs; see Table 9. Any calls for fire or medical emergencies are then transferred to the 
secondary PSAP at the Seattle Fire Department’s Fire Alarm Center.114 Seattle Police 
Communications is a civilian operation, with a mix of sworn and civilian administrative 
staff. 
Table 9.   Basic PSAP information: Seattle Police Communications 
 PSAP PROFILE 
PSAP NAME: Seattle Police Communications  
LOCATION: Seattle, WA 
TYPE: Single-discipline, Primary PSAP 
AGENCIES 
SERVED: CALL VOLUME: 
1 POLICE 870,000115 
 FIRE  
 EMS  
 
7. Spokane Fire Combined Communications Center 
The Spokane Fire Combined Communications Center was formed in 1998 as a 
consolidation of four fire dispatch centers.116 While this joint facility allowed for 
significant cost avoidance for each agency through the elimination of duplication of 
buildings and associated equipment,117 its roots lie in interoperability. In 1991, Spokane 
114 Ibid. 
115 “Seattle Police Department: 9-1-1 Communications Center,” seattle.gov, accessed August 10, 
2014, http://www.seattle.gov/police/work/911center.htm 
116 “Spokane County Combined Communications Center,” home.comcast.net, accessed May 2, 2014, 
http://home.comcast.net/~ka7fvv/scslhtml/ccc.htm 
117 “Doing a Lot with a Little,” Association of Washington Cities, accessed May 5, 2014, 
www.awcnet.org/Apps/ma/projects/2004SpokaneCombo.doc 
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County suffered from a series of firestorms that taxed fire suppression forces countywide. 
According to an article in the The Spokesman Review:  
During firestorm, dispatchers for four agencies in Spokane County 
received thousands of calls for service, leading to confusion and 
difficulties coordinating firefighting efforts. In 1998, officials created the 
Combined Communication Center, and all Spokane County fire 
emergency calls are now dispatched from one location.118  
The Spokane Fire Combined Communications Center serves 15 fire agencies, 
which encompasses all of Spokane County; see Table 10. It operates as a secondary 
PSAP to a 9-1-1 answering center that receives all 9-1-1 calls countywide, but it does no 
actual dispatching. It simply serves as a plenum to the other Spokane County PSAPs. 
Table 10.   Basic PSAP information: Spokane Fire Combined Communications Center  
 
PSAP PROFILE 
PSAP NAME: Spokane Fire Combined Communications Center 
LOCATION: Spokane, WA 
TYPE: Single-discipline, Secondary PSAP 
AGENCIES 
SERVED: CALL VOLUME: 
 POLICE  
15 FIRE 59,337 
 EMS Provided by fire service 
 
The Spokane Fire Combined Communications Center is a rarity in that it has a 
mix of uniformed and civilian staff, all of which work 24-hour shifts and are both 
emergency medical dispatch (EMD) trained and emergency medical technicians 
(EMT).119 Operationally, some agencies have agreements in place to assist if they are the 
closest unit, regardless of the size of call; however, the majority of agencies served 
follow have automatic mutual aid.120 Like Portland’s BOEC, all first responders in the 
118 Chelsea Bannach, “91 Firestorm Seared into Memory,” The Spokesman Review, October 16, 2011, 
http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2011/oct/16/91-firestorm-seared-into-areas-memory/ 
119 Lori Markham (Operations Manager, Spokane Fire Combined Communications Center) survey 
response, June 2014. 
120 Ibid. 
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county, law enforcement, and fire, share a common radio system and are a model for the 
current prevailing wisdom on interdiscipline voice interoperability. 
8. Los Angeles County Fire Department Command and Control 
The Los Angeles County Fire Department Command and Control Center is a 
secondary, fire-only PSAP that dispatches only a single agency: The Los Angeles County 
Fire Department (LACoFD), which provides fire and EMS services for the majority of 
Los Angeles County; see Table 11. The administration of the center is a mix of civilians 
and sworn personnel. The LACoFD operates a distinctive model of consolidation—
dispatch operations expand in conjunction with their fire protection services. As the fire 
department footprint of coverage expands, so does its dispatch coverage—when 
municipalities contract for fire protection with LACoFD, they also get the services of 
Command and Control. Currently, LACoFD and Command and Control serve 57 of 88 
municipalities in Los Angeles County, as well as all unincorporated areas. LACoFD 
Command and Control serves only the County Fire Department; however, responses 
often involve units from every other agency on its borders.121 
Table 11.    Basic PSAP information: LACoFD Command and Control Center 
 
PSAP PROFILE 
PSAP NAME: LACoFD Command and Control Center 
LOCATION: Los Angeles County, VA 
TYPE: Single-discipline, Secondary PSAP 
AGENCIES 
SERVED: CALL VOLUME: 
 POLICE  
1 FIRE 513,880 
 EMS Provided by fire service 
 
9. Phoenix Fire Department Regional Dispatch Center 
The Phoenix Fire Regional Dispatch Center is a fire-only, secondary PSAP that 
dispatches for the vast majority of Maricopa County, Arizona. Its service area includes 
121 Survey result.  
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the city of Phoenix and covers over 2,000 square miles; see Table 12.122 The Phoenix 
Fire Regional Dispatch Center is in many ways the interoperability gold standard—all 29 
agencies it serves are part of a common radio system, all are dispatched from the same 
CAD system, and all agencies represented are treated as one large fire department for the 
purposes of dispatching. The closest units, regardless of jurisdiction, are dispatched to 
any emergency. According to the Regional Dispatch Center,  
Each participating agency must adhere to standard operating policies and 
procedures which allows multiple agencies to work side-by-side on 
incidents under one Incident Command. This seamless cooperative effort 
ensures that the closest most appropriate resources are dispatched without 
a time or distance delay.123  
The Phoenix Fire Regional Dispatch Center employs civilians as floor personnel (call 
takers, dispatchers, and radio operators) but its administration is made up of sworn 
personnel. 





Phoenix Fire Department Regional Dispatch 
Center 
LOCATION: Phoenix, AZ 
TYPE: Single-discipline, Secondary PSAP 
AGENCIES 
SERVED: CALL VOLUME: 
 POLICE  
29 FIRE 401,216 
 EMS Provided by fire service 
 
C. PSAP SURVEY 
The survey was designed to determine the interoperability capacities of the 
surveyed PSAPs. The survey included an examination of voice interoperability within 




                                                 
disciplines and between disciplines, both for agencies served by the PSAP surveyed as 
well as those served by neighboring PSAPs.  
The survey also explored the frequency of functional interoperability—how often 
agencies within PSAPs operate at incidents with other agencies across jurisdictional 
boundaries, within and between disciplines, and from outside of the PSAP’s own service 
area. Finally, the survey examined the level to which this interoperability capacity is 
exploited, and why. 
1. Voice Interoperability Capability 
Capacity for voice interoperability was established through an examination of 
voice communication capabilities of agencies served by the PSAP. Abilities to 
communicate between disciplines, among disciplines, and between agencies were 
determined both for agencies within the PSAP and agencies from other PSAPs. Results 
are shown in Figures 2 and 3. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Survey results indicating voice interoperability capacity between 
different police agencies, different fire agencies and between police and fire 
agencies served by the PSAP 
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Figure 3.  Survey results indicating voice interoperability capacity between 
different police agencies, different fire agencies and between police and fire 
agencies served by different PSAPs 
Results show that each of the PSAPs surveyed enjoys a high level of voice 
interoperability, consistent with the prevailing wisdom: each PSAP boasts a common 
radio system that allows full voice interoperability between all disciplines and agencies 
served by the PSAP. In fact, in most cases radio interoperability within and between 
disciplines extends to neighboring PSAPs as well, whether due to sharing the same radio 
system or the ability to patch systems, with the exception of LACoFD, which must have a 
“loaner radios” for working with certain jurisdictions. However, overall, the PSAPs 
surveyed have the equipment and technology necessary to achieve unit-to-unit and 
person-to-person voice communications regardless of jurisdictional boundary or 
discipline. In most cases, the radios are intrinsically able to accomplish this without 
additional efforts such as patching.  
2. Frequency of Functional Interoperability 
The survey sought to determine how often voice interoperability was capable of 
being exercised by assessing how often different agencies at the PSAP had the 
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opportunity to operate at incidents together across discipline and jurisdictional lines. 
These opportunities included both routine incidents (defined as those incidents that occur 
regularly or require less than three units and less than one hour to mitigate) and less-
routine incidents (defined as incidents that require more than three units and one hour to 
mitigate) to assess the frequency of functional interoperability. 
As seen in Figures 4 and 5, survey responses indicate that interaction between 
agencies across disciplines, jurisdictional boundaries, and between PSAP service areas 
occur regularly. This is true of both routine incidents and less-routine incidents. 
 
Figure 4.  Survey results indicating the frequency with which different agencies 
operate together at routine incidents 
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Figure 5.  Survey results indicating the frequency with which different agencies 
operate together at less-routine incidents 
3. Realization of Interoperability Capacity 
Respondents were asked how often the interoperability capacity identified was 
exercised. In addition, the survey focused on the frequency with which interoperable 
communication was exercised on incidents routine and less-routine in nature, both 
between and within disciplines (see Figures 6 and 7). 
 
Figure 6.  Survey results indicating the frequency with which agencies exercise 
their interoperability capacity at routine incidents 
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Figure 7.  Survey results indicating the frequency with which agencies exercise 
their interoperability capacity at less-routine incidents 
The survey results indicated divergence in how often and under what 
circumstances interoperability capacity was exploited. The responses show that while 
voice interoperability capacity was exercised on a regular basis within disciplines, it was 
rarely exploited between disciplines. Respondents were also asked to identify reasons that 
an identified interoperability capacity was not utilized; the results are demonstrated 
graphically in Figures 8 and 9.  
Each PSAP director surveyed was told to select as many reasons as he or she felt 
applied to explain why interoperability was not exercised and was given the option to 
comment on other reasons not listed. A small number of directors indicated that training 
issues and organizational culture were impediments to interoperable communications; 
however, the majority of the responses indicated that it was the lack of utility that drove 
the lack of implementation. Responses most often selected indicated that the PSAPs 
chose to avoid inter-discipline interoperability because it was not necessary. This is in 
sharp contrast to intra-discipline interoperability, in which interoperability was the de 




Figure 8.  Survey results indicating the reasons inter-discipline interoperability 
capacity was not exercised at routine incidents 
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Figure 9.  Survey results indicating the reasons inter-discipline interoperability 
capacity was not exercised at less-routine incidents  
D. ANALYSIS OF SURVEY FINDINGS 
In brief, the PSAP survey findings indicate the following: 
• PSAPs surveyed have a high capacity for voice interoperability, including 
inter- and intra-discipline, inter-agency, and inter-PSAP 
• At routine and non-routine incidents, surveyed PSAPs have ample 
opportunity to exercise their interoperability capacity including inter- and 
intra-discipline, inter-agency, and inter-PSAP 
 60 
• Surveyed PSAPs exercise their capacity for voice-interoperability 
regularly within a given discipline; however, the capability is rarely 
exercised between disciplines. 
• Surveyed PSAPs predominately cited reasons indicating the lack of 
usefulness to explain their choice to not exercise inter-discipline 
interoperability 
1. Voice Interoperability Capability 
The capacity for interoperability exhibited by all surveyed PSAPs correlates with 
the prevailing wisdom on the subject, which is crystalized in the DHS National Security 
Communications Plan of 2008. The plan describes its vision “is to ensure emergency 
response personnel at all levels of government and across all disciplines can 
communicate as needed, on demand, and as authorized, through improvements in 
communications operability, interoperability, and continuity nationwide.”124 
The DHS SAFECOM program Interoperability Continuum (see Figure 10) was 
developed to enable emergency response agencies and policy makers to plan and 
implement voice and data interoperability systems. It shows that several of the surveyed 
PSAPs, thanks to a common radio system with daily usage, operate at the highest levels 
on the “technology” and “usage” fields. Interoperability capacity does not appear to be an 
issue among the surveyed PSAPs. 
 
 
124 Department of Homeland Security, National Emergency Communications Plan, 2. 
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Figure 10.  SAFECOM Interoperability Continuum125 
2. Functional Interoperability 
As demonstrated by the 9/11 attacks, the Oso mudslide in Washington, the Boston 
Marathon bombing, and other large incidents, homeland security events are likely to be 
multi-jurisdictional and multi-discipline in nature, and interoperability will be a key 
success indicator in responding to them. However, interoperability and the ability to 
collaborate does not magically appear when such incidents occur; agencies and 
disciplines working together in more routine incidents provide the groundwork for 
collaboration in regional events. This concept is well illustrated by the response to the 
Pentagon on 9/11.  
The PSAPs surveyed are well situated to take advantage of this concept. The 
survey results show that the PSAPs involved are provided and take advantage of ample 
opportunities to exercise functional interoperability on a variety of incident types across 
125 “SAFECOM Interoperability Continuum,” Statewide Interoperability Executive Committee, 
accessed May 3, 2014, http://siec.utah.gov/safecom/index.html 
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municipal borders and between and among disciplines. Most survey respondents 
indicated such opportunities are presented on a daily basis. 
3. Realization of Interoperability Capacity 
As noted above, interoperable capability and the opportunity to put it to use does 
not appear to be an issue for the PSAPs that participated in this survey. Yet, that 
capability is maximized when intra-discipline (e.g., fire-to-fire, law enforcement-to-law 
enforcement) opportunities present themselves and rarely utilized when inter-discipline 
prospects transpire, even though both opportunities occur on a daily basis. 
An examination of the reasons why this capacity is not applied indicates that it is 
not perceived as necessary. The capability could be realized, but is not deemed 
beneficial—in effect, it is underutilized by choice. As one PSAP official surveyed noted,  
Interoperability between police and fire has been portrayed as a 
technology solution. But the reality is it is a solution for a problem that 
doesn’t really exist. The fact is, cops and firemen don’t have a lot to say to 
each other tactically.126  
Two PSAPs (Denver and LACoFD) do, in fact, host law enforcement and fire 
disciplines on the same radio channel (see Figure 6). Denver 911 situates all responders 
on a common operating channel. However, this seems more for the purpose of facilitating 
situational awareness rather than communicating tactically. As Denver 911 Executive 
Director Carl Simpson explains, “when both police and fire are operating tactically, they 
are placed on different channels.”127 
LACoFD also communicates via radio with its law enforcement partners on a 
daily basis, according to Firefighter Stephen Weston.128 LACoFD has a specific 
interoperable channel for coordination of fire and law enforcement activity. When 
LACoFD units are waiting for a potentially violent scene to be secured or wish to request 
law enforcement at a scene, they can switch to this joint channel and speak directly to the 
126 Anonymous, personal communication with the author, July 14, 2014. 
127 Carl Simpson, personal communication with the author, July 14, 2014. 
128 Stephen Weston, personal communication with the author, July 14, 2014 
 63 
                                                 
law enforcement PSAP to do so. At extremely large incidents, this channel is sometimes 
used as an adjunct to the Incident Command System to coordinate activities between 
disciplines. However, this is a specific, additional channel—tactical police and fire 
communications at incidents are kept on their respective, discipline-specific channels.129 
Thus, even the graph describing frequency of inter-discipline interoperable voice 
communications (Figure 6) is misleading—even though two respondents indicated they 
employed inter-discipline communications daily, the fact is that when each discipline has 
ongoing tactical communications, they stay on their respective channels. As a Santa Cruz 
Regional 9-1-1 Administrative Supervisor noted on a survey response,  
Firefighters and police officers speak a different language (even though all 
agencies are plain text in our jurisdiction) and often feel that they don’t 
have the knowledge of each other’s radio channels to “break in” on a radio 
channel that is not specifically their own. They also struggle with the 
cultural knowledge of when it’s appropriate to speak and when it’s best to 
not be on the radio. Given that we are a consolidated communications 
center, it is just as fast and easy for them to use dispatchers to facilitate 
their communication.130 
A Seattle Police communications supervisor notes that the only time Seattle 
Police speak to Seattle Fire on the same tactical channel is at ship fires or water rescues 
in which a police boat is being used as a firefighting or rescue platform.131 This may be 
the exception that proves the rule, as this is a rare case of police and firefighters operating 
together on the same task with the same function. Because police officers are actually 
performing the work of firefighters in these instances (fire suppression and rescue), they 
are actually operating within the same discipline when sharing a tactical radio channel. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Chapter III suggested that in theory, intra-discipline interoperability had more 
value than inter-discipline interoperability. This chapter’s survey of PSAPs indicates that, 
despite adhering to the prevailing wisdom regarding interoperability in terms of 
129 Stephen Weston, private conversation with the author, July 14, 2014. 
130 Marsha MillerAyers, survey response, August 11, 2014. 
131 Karen Shilling, personal communication with the author, August 11, 2014. 
 64 
                                                 
developing capability across disciplines, in practice, intra-discipline interoperability was 
indeed given much more weight. This is not due to the fact that such communications 
were not possible, but because it is not useful. The PSAPs surveyed enjoy the capability 
and daily opportunity to engage in inter-discipline interoperable communications but 
choose not to—contrasting sharply with the fact that they take almost every opportunity 
to take advantage of interoperability within disciplines. 
In light of these findings, Chapter V will explore a hypothetical amalgamation of 
PSAPs in King County, Washington, which is currently undergoing a consolidation 
assessment. A single-disciple consolidation model will be contrasted with a multi-
discipline model to examine the potential benefits of each. 
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V. KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON: POTENTIAL MODELS FOR 
INTER- AND INTRA-DISCIPLINE CONSOLIDATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Chapters IV focused on how a national cross-section of PSAPs of various models 
managed interoperability. This chapter will use those lessons as a framework for a 
potential consolidation of PSAPs in King County, Washington, to see how 
interoperability might be facilitated in single-discipline and multi-discipline models. 
B. KING COUNTY 9-1-1 SYSTEM: BACKGROUND 
King County encompasses 2115 square miles on the eastern shore of Puget Sound 
in the state of Washington.132 It is the state’s most populous county with just over two 
million people.133 The county is home to 39 incorporated cities, the largest of which 
include Seattle (population: 634,535),134 Bellevue (126,439),135 and Kent (122,999).136 
King County currently has 12 PSAPs, which serve 59 agencies (see Table 13), 
with oversight by the King County 9-1-1 Program Office. This complement of PSAPs 
consists of two large multi-discipline PSAPs, one small multi-discipline PSAP, three 
small single-discipline consolidated PSAPs, and six single agency PSAPs. These PSAPs 
are widely divergent in size and volume of calls received (see Table 14)— the busiest six 
PSAPs handle approximately 97 percent of King County’s 9-1-1 calls. 
Each PSAP has redundant systems for continuity of operations, as well as a 
defined alternate location from which to operate should their primary facility become 
compromised. In each case, this back up facility is one of the other King County 
PSAPs.137 
132 “State and County QuickFacts: King County, Washington,” United States Census Bureau, last 





137 GeoComm, King County, Washington PSAP Consolidation Assessment, 5–4.  
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Table 13.   King County PSAP names, type and number/discipline of agencies served138 
KING COUNTY PSAP  TYPE AGENCIES 
POLICE FIRE 
Bothell Police Department Single discipline 2  
Enumclaw Police Department Multi discipline 1 1 
Issaquah Police Department Single discipline 2 
 
King County Sheriff Single Agency 11 
North East King County Regional Public Safety 
Communication Agency (NORCOM) Multi discipline 5 15 
Port of Seattle Police Department Multi discipline 1 1 
Redmond Police Department Single discipline 3 
 Seattle Police Department Single Agency 1 
University of Washington Police Department Single Agency 1 
Valley Communications Center (Valley Com) Multi discipline 9 13 
Washington State Patrol Single Agency 1  
Seattle Fire Alarm Center Single Agency  1 
Table 14.   King County PSAP Call Volume (2011)139 
KING COUNTYPSAP BY CALL VOLUME 
9-1-1 CALL VOLUME 
TOTAL POLICE FIRE 
Seattle Police Department 523,021 523,021  
Valley Communications Center  439,320 305,206 85,450 
King County Sheriff 331,966 331,966 
 
Washington State Patrol 246,910 246,910 
North East King County Regional Public Safety Communication 
Agency (NORCOM) 151,391 97,579
140 53,812141 
Seattle Fire Alarm Center 82,495  82,495 
Redmond Police Department 20,568 20,568 
 Bothell Police Department 14,829 14,829 
Issaquah Police Department 10,818 10,818 
Port of Seattle Police Department 13,508 8658 4850 
Enumclaw Police Department 4184 2307 1877 
University of Washington Police Department 3763 3763  
 
138 All numbers from GeoComm, King County, Washington PSAP Consolidation Assessment. 
139 Ibid. 
140 North East King County Regional Public Safety Communication Agency, 2011 Annual Report 




                                                 
1. King County 9-1-1 Program Office 
The King County 9-11 Program Office is a unit of the King County Office of 
Emergency Management (OEM) responsible for the provision of E9-1-1 service within 
its jurisdiction, and is financially supported through an E9-1-1 tax levied upon 
subscribers of wireline, wireless, and voice over Internet protocol (VoIP) communication 
services.142 In turn, the King County 9-11 Program Office financially supports the 
county’s 12 PSAPs through providing and maintaining the E9-1-1 system, funding for 
system staff support, and a partial distribution to the local PSAPs of the E9-1-1 excise tax 
levied by the county. Governance is through the King County Enhanced 9-1-1 
Participation Agreement between the 12 PSAPs and the King County 9-11 Program 
Office. This agreement prioritizes how excise tax revenue is to be disbursed. Those 
priorities are:143 
• Purchase and maintain PSAP equipment including upgrades required for  
NG9-1-1 
• Defray the costs of operations payable to the telephone companies as 
defined in  
9-1-1 tariffs and service agreements 
• Pay for the costs for 9-1-1 program administration, risk management and 
PSAP insurance 
• Defray costs associated with PSAP consolidation 
• Contribute to costs associated with county approved PSAP support staff 
• Defray operational and equipment costs for PSAP operations 
While the King County 9-11 Program Office expends funds on system 
administration and overhead, public education, and a reserve fund, the vast majority of 
the funds are devoted to the 9-1-1 system infrastructure or disbursed to the PSAPs. In 
addition, 42 percent of expenditures go to 9-1-1 infrastructure, such as network databases 
and equipment, and nearly 44 percent is distributed among the PSAPs for training, 
equipment, and technical support.144  
142 GeoComm, King County, Washington PSAP Consolidation Assessment, 3–5.  
143 Ibid. 
144 Ibid., 3–6. 
 69 
                                                 
2. King County 9-1-1 Voice and Data Interoperability 
According to a study performed in 2012 by GeoComm, a firm with extensive 
public safety and PSAP consulting experience, “interoperability functionality is at a high 
level in and among the King County PSAPs.”145 The King County 9-1-1 system 
functions at a high level of interoperability both PSAP-to-PSAP and agency-to-agency 
via radio and CAD technology. 
a. Radio Interoperability 
With the exception of two PSAPs that use unique radio systems in daily 
operations, King County PSAPs and the agencies they represent enjoy a high level of 
voice interoperability. This is provided by the King County Regional Radio System, an 
800 MHz trunked radio system employed by 10 of 12 King County PSAPs, consisting of 
27 transmitter sites and multiple interconnecting microwave and fiber systems. The 
system encompasses approximately 14,000 radio users countywide, including police, fire, 
EMS, school districts, utility operators and other government functions.146 This includes 
a dedicated PSAP to PSAP radio channel to facilitate communications among dispatch 
centers in the King County 9-1-1 system. 
In line with the prevailing wisdom regarding intra- and inter-disciplinary 
interoperability, the system provides voice communication between all agencies that 
utilize it and provides a “robust complement of shared talk-groups for use during 
incidents when interoperability is necessary for long periods of time.”147 On 
SAFECOM’s Interoperability Continuum (see Figure 10, Chapter IV), developed to 
enable emergency response agencies and policy makers to plan and implement voice and 
data interoperability systems, GeoComm ranked King County at Level 4 (of 5 levels) on 
the voice elements lane of the Technology scale. A proposed radio replacement project 
that incorporates a P25 phase two-trunked would move that ranking to Level 5.148 Due to 
145 Ibid., 5–8. 
146 “Radio Communication Services,” last updated April 9, 2012, King County, 
http://www.kingcounty.gov/operations/it/it-services/radio.aspx 
147 GeoComm, King County, Washington PSAP Consolidation Assessment, 5–1. 
148 Ibid. 
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the fact that the King County Regional Radio System is used daily throughout the county, 
it is rated at the highest level on the Usage scale as well.149 
The two dispatch centers that are not a part of the King County Regional Radio 
System are the Port of Seattle Police PSAP and the Washington State Patrol PSAP. The 
Port of Seattle PSAP dispatches for the Port of Seattle Fire Department at King County 
Airport and the Port of Seattle Police, which provides law enforcement services to the 
airport and seaport properties.150 The port public safety agencies use an 800 MHz 
trunked system, which can be patched for direct communication with radios on the King 
County Regional System.151 Although it requires an extra step, interoperability with the 
rest of King County PSAPs is possible. 
The Washington State Patrol is a statewide law enforcement agency and presently 
operates in King County using the same non-trunked VHF radio system that it uses 
statewide. The Washington State Patrol is in the process of transitioning to a P25 radio 
system that would be capable of operating on the King County regional system; however, 
implementation problems have delayed the project, and the Puget Sound region has not 
yet incorporated the new system.152 According to the GeoComm report:  
Today, interoperability between the State Patrol and other regional 
agencies is primarily achieved through messages relayed by dispatchers 
and face-to-face contact at the scene of the incident. In a few cases 
regional PSAPs have VHF conventional channels the patrol units can use 
to contact them.153 
b. Data Interoperability 
A regional CAD Interoperability Project is underway in King County in order to 
allow data sharing among the region’s various CAD systems, which will require the 
149 Ibid. 
150 “About the Port,” Port of Seattle, accessed May 3, 2014, http://www.portseattle.org/About/Public-
Safety/Police-Department/Pages/default.aspx 
151 GeoComm, King County, Washington PSAP Consolidation Assessment, 5–2. 
152 Greg Gordon and Lydia Mulvany, “Motorola Systematically Builds Emergency Radio 
Stranglehold,” The News Tribune, April 8, 2014, 
http://www.thenewstribune.com/2014/04/08/3138351/motorola-systematically-builds.html  
153 GeoComm, King County, Washington PSAP Consolidation Assessment, 5–2. 
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upgrade of a regional CAD data switch. The King County 9-1-1 office will contract for 
the upgrade of this regional switch, but because there are multiple CAD systems in use, 
individual PSAPs will be responsible to coordinate with their CAD vendor to develop 
and implement an interface between their CAD system and that switch. If completed, the 
CAD Interoperability Project will provide data interoperability reaching the Level 3 on 
the Data Elements lane of SAFECOM Interoperability Continuum’s Technology scale 
(see Figure 10).154 
3. King County 9-1-1 Consolidation Assessment 
In 2011, the King County 9-1-1 Program Office began seeking “an experienced, 
qualified firm to provide a high quality professional PSAP consolidation assessment of 
the King County E-911 system.”155 The stated goal of the assessment was “to evaluate 
whether the current PSAP configuration is providing the most efficient and effective 
emergency communications services possible to the public.”156 The means to that goal 
were presented as the reasons the assessment was conducted: 
• Reducing the number of 9-1-1 call transfers157 
• Projected costs of NG911 (Next Generation 911) implementation158 
• Reduction of King County E911 funding demands159 
 
154 Ibid., 5–4. 
155 “PSAP Consolidation Assessment of the King County E-911 System,” National Emergency 
Number Association, accessed May 1, 2014, 
http://www.nena.org/m/feed_detail.asp?id=16078&mid=694406  
156 Marlys Davis, Memo to Readers of GeoComm’s Existing Conditions and Final Recommendations 




158 Davis, Memo to Readers of GeoComm’s Existing Conditions.” 
159 King County E911 Program Office, “King County PSAP Consolidation Assessment and PSAP 
Future Configuration Recommendation Process” [presentation], King County, September 2013, 
kingcounty.gov/~/media/safety/E911/documents/Final_Assesment_Presentation_9-23-13.ashx 
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a. Reducing the Number of 9-1-1 Call Transfers 
Transfer calls, by their very nature, increase the processing time of a 9-1-1 call, 
whether they are a result of a call to the wrong jurisdiction or to a secondary PSAP. Not 
only does the physical act of transferring the call take time, but information obtained by 
the original call taker must be obtained again by the call taker taking the transfer.160 
Consolidation, by reducing the number of PSAPs or eliminating secondary PSAPs, would 
reduce the number of transfers, thus rendering more efficient service. 
b. Projected Costs of NG911 Implementation 
The current 9-1-1 system was designed to provide one service: provide a single 
answering point for the human voice via telephony. According to NENA,  
In the past 15 years, advancements in modern communications technology 
have created the need for a more advanced system to access emergency 
care. While the existing 9-1-1 system has been a success story for more 
than 30 years, it has been stretched to its limit as technology advances.161  
The future of 9-1-1, known as Next Generation 9-1-1 (NG9-1-1), will enable 
PSAPs to receive emergency text messages, images and video (including those from 
American Sign Language users), as well as access telematics data, medical information 
and other data.162 It is difficult to determine the cost impact of NG9-1-1 on PSAP 
technology budgets since many of the details about how NG9-1-1 will be implemented at 
the national, state, and regional levels are still unresolved.163 However, NG9-1-1 will 
require a system comprised of hardware, software, data, and new demands on call-takers 
to implement, which will require a corresponding increase in costs in installation and 
maintenance. The more PSAPs that require these products and services, the greater the 
cost will be.  
160 GeoComm, King County, Washington PSAP Consolidation Assessment, 1–8. 
161 “NG9-1-1 Project,” National Emergency Number Association, accessed May 8, 2014, 
http://www.nena.org/?NG911_Project 
162 “What is NG9-1-1?” National Emergency Number Association, accessed May 8, 2014, 
http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.nena.org/resource/resmgr/ng9-1-1_project/whatisng911.pdf 
163 GeoComm, King County, Washington PSAP Consolidation Assessment, 2–6. 
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NG9-1-1’s demand on call takers will disproportionately affect smaller PSAPs, as 
noted by GeoComm: 
NG9-1-1 will, in fact, significantly influence and push the need for smaller 
agencies to consider consolidation, at least for some of the services they 
provide. Smaller agencies will likely not be in a position to replace 
equipment or hire and train additional staff, especially if the support 
funding from KCE9-1-1 is not available. This factor could impact the 
viability of the small PSAPs significantly.164 
c. King County 911 Funding Demands 
With regard to King County funding for PSAPs, the GeoComm report states, 
“PSAPs in King County are well funded when compared to other agencies across the 
country.”165 As noted above, nearly 44 percent of the King County 9-1-1 Program 
Office’s expenditures are disbursed for direct PSAP support. However, with the 
duplication of equipment, training and technology of each PSAP, there is some question 
whether the model is financially sustainable in the future, particularly with the advent of 
the NG9-1-1 upgrade. In the event the money disbursed directly to the PSAPs had to be 
reduced, it is questionable whether the smaller PSAPs could overcome the economic 
impact. 
C. THE FUTURE OF KING COUNTY 9-1-1 
King County 9-1-1 is seriously considering consolidation of its PSAPs as 
evidenced by its contract with GeoComm, which produced an Existing Conditions Report 
in 2012 and a Final Recommendations Report released in June of 2013. The reports 
determined not only that consolidation was feasible, but provided recommendations for 
how that consolidation should be carried out.  
Given the serious consideration to consolidation in King County, a hypothetical 
case study of how consolidation may function under a multi-discipline PSAP model and a 
single-discipline model may useful in determining which would most further 
interoperability. GeoComm’s Final Recommendations Report contained several models 
164 Ibid., 15. 
165 Ibid., 3–16. 
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for consolidation, including one recommended as the “optimum model.”166 Although the 
King County PSAP Consolidation Steering Committee indicates that the GeoComm 
report is “not a comprehensive implementation plan,”167 it acknowledges that 
GeoComm’s report will be used “as the starting point for the next, [sic] decision-making 
phase that will develop a comprehensive plan.”168 While the Steering Committee 
suggests that no consensus has been reached regarding the GeoComm report’s model, it 
will be used as a “framework for the implementation team.”169 As of this writing, no 
other plan has been proffered. 
Given that GeoComm’s “optimum model” is the only current consolidation plan 
under consideration (GeoComm’s alternate “Model B” shared nearly every key aspect of 
the “optimum plan”), the fact that it will be the springboard for any future plan and that it 
is a multi-disciplinary plan (as were all of the GeoComm models), make it worth 
exploring as the hypothetical multi-disciplinary model for this case study. It will be 
contrasted with a potential single-discipline model, using the following methodology: 
• The GeoComm Existing Conditions Report and Final Recommendations 
Report represent a snapshot in time from 2011. Data from these reports 
was used in the formulation of the GeoComm “optimum plan” for 
consolidation. For consistency’s sake, the same data will be used for the 
single-discipline model. 
• In some instances and due to a variety of reasons, call volume calculations 
and other numbers in the GeoComm reports differ from the official annual 
reports of the individual PSAPs. Again, in the interests of consistency, 
numbers from the GeoComm reports will be utilized in analyzing both 
models. 
• The costs involved in the GeoComm report would also need to be updated 
in any comprehensive consolidation implementation effort. That said, the 
costs as written in the GeoComm report for 2011 will be applied to both 
models for purposes of comparison. 
 
166 GeoComm’s Final Recommendations Report, 6–1. 




                                                 
• According to the GeoComm reports, the University of Washington Police 
PSAP and the Port of Seattle Police PSAP, due to their populations served 
and unique requirements, “make them challenging partners for a 
consolidation with any existing traditional PSAP and would present new 
challenges if they combined.”170 Similarly, the Washington State Patrol 
PSAP “as a component of a state agency has a very focused service area 
and function which is not enhanced by consolidation with local 
government agencies.”171 To maintain cost comparisons and because 
these PSAPs do not interfere with the single-discipline model theory, the 
same restrictions were places on the single-agency model presented.  
 
D. KING COUNTY PSAP CONSOLIDATION MODEL: A PLAN FOR 
MULTI-DISCIPLINE PSAPS 
The optimum model for PSAP consolidation as recommended by GeoComm in its 
final recommendations report consisted of amalgamating King County’s 12 PSAPs into 
three multi-discipline centers and three smaller centers as follows (see Table 15): 
• Seattle Police and the Fire Alarm Center combine as a civilian-staffed 
combined PSAP as an independent city department 
• Enumclaw Police combining with Valley Com 
• Consolidation of NORCOM, Bothell, Issaquah, and Redmond into the 
King County Sheriff’s Office  
• Washington State Patrol transitions to a secondary PSAP 










170 GeoComm, King County, Washington PSAP Consolidation Assessment, 1–8. 
171 Ibid. 
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Table 15.   GeoComm consolidation plan. Figures calculated from those in Table 2. 

















443,504 Enumclaw Police Department 307,513 87,327 
NORCOM 





King County Sheriff 
Redmond Police Department 
Bothell Police Department 
Issaquah Police Department 475,760 53,812172 
Washington State Patrol Becomes a secondary PSAP 1  246,910 
University of Washington Police 
Department No change 1  3763 
Port of Seattle Police Department No change 1 1 8658 
 
1. Compliance with Stated Goals of County 9-1-1 Consolidation 
Assessment 
The King County 9-11 Program Office had three goals in its consideration of 
consolidation, including reducing the number of 9-1-1 call transfers, mitigating projected 
costs of next generation 9-1-1 implementation, and creating a sustainable funding system 
for the King County 9-1-1 system. The GeoComm optimum model makes inroads on 
each of these goals. 
a. Reduction of 9-1-1 Call Transfers 
By reducing the number of PSAPs, the number of transfers from one PSAP to 
another will be reduced simply because more jurisdictions will be housed under the same 
roof. Wireless calls in particular can reach a PSAP outside the jurisdiction in which the 
call originated. By bringing the 26 of the county’s 30 agencies into three large PSAPs 
instead of the nine in which they currently reside, transfers will be reduced and 
processing times for those calls will be lessened.  
172 North East King County Regional Public Safety Communication Agency, 2011 Annual Report, 8. 
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Transfers by design will be reduced, particularly in the City of Seattle because the 
Fire Alarm Center is a secondary PSAP, and each one of its more than 80,000 calls by 
design necessitates a transfer from Seattle Police. Although the delay is only seconds, it 
does require a duplication of effort by call takers at each PSAP. By consolidating these 
operations, this issue would be eliminated. 
The optimum model also has the Washington State Patrol (WSP) PSAP 
transitioning from a primary PSAP to a secondary PSAP. As a state agency, the 
jurisdiction of WSP is the entire state of Washington. Typically, state troopers patrol and 
respond to incidents on interstates and state highways, where they bear primary 
responsibility regardless of municipality.173 Regardless, the geography of their 
jurisdiction overlaps all other jurisdictions. Due to the nature of wireless calls and the 
proximity of cellular towers to freeways, wireless calls intended for the State Patrol are 
routed to other PSAPs and vice versa and require a transfer. The King County 9-1-1 
Program statistics show that such transfers are required on less than 2 percent of WSP 
calls.174 By recommending that the WSP become a secondary PSAP, however, the 
“optimum plan” creates a situation in which each of the more than 250,000 calls received 
there will be transfers, which represents an overall increase in the number of transferred 
calls. 
b. Projected Costs of NG911 Implementation 
Since NG9-1-1 will require a system of hardware, software, and data, there will a 
corresponding increase in costs in installation and maintenance. By reducing the number 
of PSAPs from 12 to 6, the “optimum plan” will reduce those costs correspondingly. 
King County 9-1-1 will only have to support this technology in half the PSAPs it would 
under the current operational model. However, the hard costs of technology and 
maintenance are only part of the story. 
173 “Revised Code of Washington, 47.52.210: Law Enforcement Jurisdiction within City or Town,” 
Washington State Legislature, accessed September 10, 2014, 
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=47.52.200 
174 GeoComm, King County, Washington PSAP Consolidation Assessment, 5–1, 5–2. 
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The addition of NG-911 features, such as receiving text, images, and other data, 
will place additional burdens on dispatchers and will impact their workload. As the 
GeoComm report states: 
There is some concern that PSAPs will not be able to maintain the current 
level of service when NG9-1-1 is fully implemented. NG9-1-1 will make 
it challenging for a single position PSAP to handle both voice and non-
voice calls. A single call taker/dispatcher will not be able to effectively 
process these two types of calls at the same time. The additional data that 
will be both available and sent to the PSAP with NG9-1-1 calls will need 
to be managed and handled. This additional information that is part of the 
NG9-1-1 call will clearly impact current PSAP staffing levels.175  
The larger PSAPs created by the optimum model,” with their greater staffing 
levels, will be better able to absorb this additional workload while still maintaining levels 
of service. Smaller PSAPs, such as the Enumclaw Police dispatch center, will be unlikely 
to be able to maintain performance once NG9-1-1 is implemented. 
c. King County 911 Funding Demands 
King County PSAPs receive revenue from King County 9-1-1, not only in direct 
financial support, but also for technical support, training, and equipment. This support 
represented 26 percent of the PSAP budgets in 2011.176 This direct financial support is 
currently based on the number of 9-1-1 calls received; therefore, if the current funding 
model is continued, the support level will remain unchanged, as the total call volume for 
King County will be present regardless of the number of PSAPs. However, certain 
equipment is necessary to operate a PSAP regardless of size or call volume. By reducing 
the number of PSAPs from 12 to six, the amount of equipment to purchase, as well as the 
corresponding technical support required to maintain and upgrade it, is also reduced. 
Consolidation also reduces the number dispatchers necessary in the system as a 
whole. This is primarily due to economy of scale and the reduction in duplication of 
supervisory and management staff. The Fire Alarm Center, which utilizes sworn 
firefighters as dispatchers, has higher average salaries than their civilian counterparts. 
175 Ibid., 2–12. 
176 Ibid., 2–5. 
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Since the “optimum plan” combines the Fire Alarm Center with the Seattle Police in a 
civilian PSAP, the additional costs of firefighters would be saved. Much is made of these 
savings in the GeoComm report; it concludes the optimum model results in a minimum 
estimated cost savings of $2,899,946 annually in dispatcher salary costs alone.177 
However, this does not result in any financial savings to King County 9-1-1, which does 
not pay for dispatcher salaries; that cost is paid by the PSAP or the jurisdiction (such as 
the Seattle Fire Department) that employs them. Dispatcher salaries play no part in the 
sustainability of King County 9-1-1, and thus civilianization of fire dispatch does not 
impact King County 9-1-1 financially. 
2. Other Potential Advantages of GeoComm Optimum Model 
Larger PSAPs require a larger back-up facility to accommodate their larger on-
floor staffing requirements. The optimum model provides each PSAP with a potential 
back-up center of similar size. Larger PSAPs also enable resources be pooled and 
utilized, such as equipment, staff, and training opportunities that may not be funded in a 
single PSAP.178 Reducing the number of PSAPs from 12 to six also reduces King County 
9-1-1’s span of control, which could lead to easier and increased oversight.179 Finally, a 
larger PSAP has more operating personnel on the dispatch floor, and thus has more 
“surge capacity” than a smaller PSAP, which creates capability to more readily handle an 
event that creates a massive influx of 9-1-1 calls, such as a terrorist attack, earthquake, or 
air disaster.180  
3. Potential Disadvantages of GeoComm Optimum Model 
The GeoComm “Optimal Model” is not without its disadvantages. For all the 
benefits of larger PSAPs, smaller PSAPs (and especially single agency PSAPs) provide 
more local control and are better able to reflect the goals of the jurisdiction or 
organization. Amalgamated PSAPs carry with them the burden of an amalgamated 
177 Ibid., 1–9. 
178 Ibid., 1–8. 
179 Ibid., 1–9. 
180 Ibid., 1–12. 
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governance structure, which can result in slow changes to policy or practices due to 
increased bureaucracy. Smaller jurisdictions also fear that their desires may be 
overshadowed by the needs of larger municipalities. These concerns are reflected in the 
GeoComm report: 
Bothell, Redmond, and Issaquah are reluctant to participate in membership 
of NORCOM due to perceived inequity in decision-making. They have 
expressed a fear that as a smaller community and a late “joiner” to the 
NORCOM jurisdiction, they will not have a sufficient voice in its 
governance and policy, whereas today they have complete control over 
their own PSAP operation.181 
Because they are staffed 24/7/365, PSAPs often provide a variety of ancillary 
functions for the agencies and municipalities they serve. GeoComm identifies these 
duties among PSAPs in King County as including, but not limited to, handling walk-in 
traffic for records and fingerprinting requests, jail business, issuance of concealed pistol 
licenses (CPLs), monitoring jail security cameras, answering after-hours administrative 
lines for other city departments, and answering panic and fire alarms.182 Some of these 
ancillary tasks are so ingrained in the culture of each PSAP that it may not even be 
realized that the practice is agency specific. However, consolidation may render many of 
these duties impossible in the new model. If so, an alternate means of performing these 
secondary duties must be found. 
Political obstacles will be present in nearly any consolidation scenario, and it is 
not within the scope of this thesis to address each such difficulty. However, the 
GeoComm optimum model presents two hurdles that will have a financial and 
operational impact. In adding 12 new police agencies and 15 fire agencies representing 
more than 200,000 additional calls per year, The King County Sheriff PSAP will need to 
be reconfigured or redesigned to accommodate this growth, which would interrupt 
operations and incur costs.183 
181 Ibid., 2–4. 
182 Ibid., 2–11. 
183 Ibid., 1–9. 
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Greater still will be the impact on the City of Seattle. The optimum model states 
that “the City of Seattle should design and build a suitable facility to accommodate the 
consolidated operations of police and fire/EMS communications”184 under a new city 
department.185 Creation of a new city department is no small undertaking, and building a 
new PSAP to house it would incur millions in costs. In addition, the city would have to 
vacate the state of the art facility that currently houses its Fire Alarm Center, King 
County’s newest PSAP, completed in 2008 at a cost of $36 million (including attached 
Emergency Operations Center and Fire Station 10).186 Since the proposed Seattle Police/
Fire PSAP would be a civilian operation, Seattle’s firefighter/dispatchers would need to 
be reassigned to engine or ladder companies, which would incur training costs. In some 
cases, firefighter/dispatcher injuries would make their return to fire duty impossible, and 
they would simply be retired. In essence, GeoComm’s “Optimal Model” passes a 
tremendous financial and organizational burden on to the city of Seattle to achieve some 
of its efficiencies. Politically, this may be insurmountable. 
4. Potential Effects on Interoperability 
As discussed previously, King County already operates at a high level of voice 
interoperability through its regional radio system. However, multiple CAD systems are in 
use by the various PSAPs, and in fact, NORCOM uses different CAD systems for police 
and fire operations. NORCOM call takers must determine whether a call is for law 
enforcement or for fire/EMS services before they know which CAD system(s) to utilize 
for call processing.187 By consolidating 12 PSAPs into six, fewer CAD variations will be 
present, which would better lay the groundwork for King County’s regional CAD 
interoperability initiative. 
184 Ibid. 
185 Ibid., 1–7. 
186 Pacific Coast Architecture Database, “City of Seattle, Fire Department (SFD) Station #10, Second 
Station, Pioneer Square, Seattle, WA,” Universtiy Libraries, University of Washingotn, accessed May 19, 
2014, https://digital.lib.washington.edu/architect/structures/5318/ id 5318 
187 GeoComm, King County, Washington PSAP Consolidation Assessment, 2–21. 
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Operationally, all of Seattle’s emergency responders would be dispatched by a 
single PSAP. Their communications, status, and location would originate from the same 
facility, thus offering maximum inter-discipline interoperability for joint operations. 
Intra-disciplinary interoperability in Seattle would not be affected. The remainder of King 
County’s emergency responders would be split between two facilities, Valley Com and 
the King County Sheriff’s Office PSAP. Valley Com would absorb only the Enumclaw 
police and fire departments and would make insignificant gains in interoperability in 
south King County. 
The King County Sheriff’s office, by adding 12 law enforcement agencies, would 
significantly improve intra-disciplinary interoperability among police agencies. Fire 
agencies would see no improvement, as they are currently already consolidated in 
NORCOM. Inter-disciplinary interoperability between police and fire would be greatly 
enhanced as 15 fire agencies would share communications, status, and location 
information with 11 law enforcement agencies they previously did not. The GeoComm 
report notes, “For incidents that require both a law enforcement and fire response, one 
PSAP is in a better position to effectively manage the incidents, with both police and fire 
disciplines receiving the exact same information at the exact same time.”188 
Interoperability between the PSAPs will not change, and joint responses between 
agencies of different PSAPs will not be affected. A list of advantages and disadvantages 







188 Ibid., 5–2. 
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Table 16.   Advantages and disadvantages of GeoComm “Optimal Model” compared the 
status quo. 
ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES 
Number of PSAPs reduced from 12 to 6 
City of Seattle required to build new PSAP, train 
civilian dispatchers, and create new city 
department 
Call transfers reduced between PSAPs, 
particularly Seattle Police and Fire 
Call transfers increase tremendously as WSP 
becomes a secondary PSAP 
Higher staffing levels for NG9-1-1 
implementation Smaller PSAPs feel disenfranchised 
Lower overall staffing requirements Less local/agency control 
Reduced installation and upkeep costs for NG-
911 technology Ancillary duties must be reassigned 
Increase in surge capacity King County 9-1-1 finance model unaffected 
City of Seattle inter-discipline interoperability at 
maximum No change to intra-discipline interoperability 
Inter-discipline interoperability increased No countywide interoperability 
Redundant facility plan intact Countywide, intra-disciplinary interoperability only marginally increased 
CAD interoperability upgraded  
 
E. KING COUNTY PSAP CONSOLIDATION MODEL: A PLAN FOR 
SINGLE-DISCIPLINE PSAPS 
In its Final Recommendations Report, the optimum model was not the only 
potential model examined by GeoComm. In all, 6 new models were explored,189 
including “Model B,” which was a slight variation of the optimum model. Not a single 
model discussed the possibility of consolidation based on dispatch discipline; in fact, all 
but two models recommended that Seattle’s Fire Alarm Center, the only fire-only PSAP 
in the county, merge into a multi-discipline facility. 
In examining the concept of a “single-discipline model,” an ideal plan would 
create one law enforcement PSAP, one fire PSAP, and one PSAP for the Washington 
State Patrol, that possesses unique needs making it unsuitable for consolidation. A model 
such as this would maximize interoperability within the disciplines (intra-disciplinary 
interoperability). However, the ideal is not always possible, and the GeoComm “optimum 
model,” despite its name, took those realities into account. Rather than attempt to create a 
perfect plan that is not feasible for political or financial reasons, the proposed single-
189 Ibid.,, 3–2, 3–3. 
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discipline model was guided by and used many of the assumptions utilized in the creation 
of the GeoComm optimum model. This will simplify examination how the goals of King 
County 9-1-1 Program Office could be attained in the single-discipline format and easily 
compared with the benefits and disadvantages of the “Optimal Model” (see Table 16). 
The benefits of an ideal single-discipline model may be easily extrapolated in the context 
of the model examined below (see Table 17). 
The single-discipline model incorporates the following elements: 
• The Seattle Fire Alarm Center becomes the central PSAP for all fire and 
EMS services countywide, and remains a secondary PSAP 
• The Seattle Police PSAP remains unchanged 
• The Enumclaw Police PSAP would be absorbed by Valley Com 
• Consolidation of NORCOM’s law enforcement agencies, Bothell, 
Issaquah, and Redmond into the King County Sheriff’s Office  
• Washington State Patrol transition to a secondary PSAP 
• University of Washington Police and the Port of Seattle remain unchanged 




















 307,513 Enumclaw Police Department 307,513 
NORCOM 





King County Sheriff 
Redmond Police Department 
Bothell Police Department 
Issaquah Police Department 475,760 
Washington State Patrol Becomes a secondary PSAP 1  246,910 
University of Washington Police 
Department No change 1  3763 
Port of Seattle Police Department No change 1 1 8658 
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1. Compliance with Stated Goals of County 9-1-1 Consolidation 
Assessment 
A comparison to the GeoComm optimum model begins with an analysis of how 
well the single-discipline model meets the goals the King County 9-11 Program Office 
set in its consideration of consolidation: reduction of 9-1-1 call transfers, mitigation of 
projected costs of NG9-1-1 implementation, and creation of a sustainable funding system 
for the King County 9-1-1 system.  
a. Reduction of 9-1-1 Call Transfers 
As with the GeoComm offering, the single-discipline model reduces the number 
of PSAPs, which in turn will reduce the number of ad hoc transfers between PSAPs. The 
single-discipline model will be slightly less effective in this regard as it maintains seven 
PSAPs instead of six, but will still improve the situation. The experience of wireless calls 
reaching a PSAP outside the jurisdiction in which the call originated will be improved by 
the same margin, again slightly less effectively than the GeoComm model. 
Because the Fire Alarm Center remains a secondary PSAP in the “Single-
discipline Model,” the 80,000 9-1-1 call transfers eliminated by the optimum model will 
still be in place. Since both the GeoComm model and the single-discipline model change 
convert the Washington State Patrol PSAP into a secondary PSAP, both models 
ultimately increase the number of transfers. However, the single-discipline model will, by 
design, require about 25 percent more transfers than the “Optimal Model.” 
b. Projected Costs of NG911 Implementation 
By reducing the number of PSAPs from 12 to six, the optimum model will reduce 
costs of NG9-1-1’s system of hardware, software, and data by roughly 50 percent. By 
retaining an additional PSAP, the single-discipline model will reduce the costs about 42 
percent. The additional call taker workload brought on by NG9-1-1 will be alleviated by 
both models, as both plans create larger PSAPs with greater staffing levels that will be 
better able to absorb this additional workload while still maintaining levels of service. 
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c. King County 911 Funding Demands 
King County 9-1-1’s direct financial support to PSAPs will not be reduced by 
either consolidation model discussed here as that support is based on number of 9-1-1 
calls, not the number of PSAPs. However, by reducing the number of PSAPs from 12 to 
seven instead of six, the amount of equipment to purchase, as well as the corresponding 
technical support required to maintain and upgrade it, will be reduced. This will be 
slightly less than the multi-discipline model.  
The single-discipline model reduces the number dispatchers necessary in the 
system as a whole for the same reasons as the optimum model: economy of scale and the 
reduction in duplication of supervisory and management staff. The Fire Alarm Center, 
which utilizes sworn firefighters as dispatchers, will require more firefighter/dispatchers 
(with higher average salaries than their civilian counterparts) to handle the increased call 
volume. As noted, however, this does not result in any financial savings to King County 
9-1-1, which does not pay for dispatcher salaries. Even so, these costs would be offset to 
some degree by increased funding from King County due to the FAC’s increase in call 
volume as well as contract for services costs for dispatching fire departments currently 
served by Valley Com and NORCOM. 
2. Other Potential Advantages of the Single-discipline Model 
The single-discipline model provides for an equivalent sized back-up facility for 
each PSAP, and, like the optimum model,” it provides for larger PSAPs that enable 
resources such as equipment, staff, and training opportunities be pooled and utilized. 
However, since the single-discipline model separates fire dispatching from law 
enforcement dispatching, PSAPs can devote all of their training resources to one 
discipline or another. In the “Optimal Plan,” all PSAPs have to train on radio and call-
taking for both disciplines. By separating the disciplines, training time can be cut in half 
to save money or the training time effectively doubled since only one discipline can be 
the focus for all training.  
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The reduction of the number of PSAPs from 12 to seven will reduce King County 
9-1-1’s span of control, which may lead to easier and increased oversight.190 The larger 
PSAPs created will, like the “Optimal Model,” feature more operating personnel on the 
dispatch floor. In addition, it provides more “surge capacity” than a smaller PSAP and 
creates capability to more readily handle an event that creates a massive influx of 9-1-1 
calls, such as a terrorist attack, earthquake, or air disaster.191 Due to specialized 
operational practices at the FAC, it will have greater surge capacity than the other PSAPs, 
which will be discussed in Section 5 below. 
3. Potential Disadvantages of the Single-discipline Model 
Like the GeoComm “Optimal Model,” the single-discipline model is not without 
its disadvantages. Smaller PSAPs (and especially single agency PSAPs) provide more 
local control and are better able to reflect the goals of their jurisdiction or organization; 
however, each PSAP will be a specialist in its respective discipline, and so no one 
discipline will be marginalized by another. Like the “Optimal Model,” the amalgamated 
PSAPs of the single-discipline model will carry with them the burden of an amalgamated 
governance structure, which may result in slow changes to policy or practices due to 
increased bureaucracy. Smaller jurisdictions may fear that their desires may be 
overshadowed by the needs of larger municipalities, no matter their discipline.  
The ancillary functions for the various PSAPs are still going to require 
adjustment. However, because they are separated by discipline, the ancillary functions 
will likely be easier to assimilate. Citywide coverage for fire companies is likely to be 
comparable no matter the jurisdiction. Similarly, duties such as handling walk in traffic 
for records and fingerprinting requests, jail business, issuance of concealed pistol licenses 
(CPLs) are likely similar in law enforcement PSAPs. In addition, the monitoring of fire 
alarm systems is a function that the FAC already undertakes, and it would expect to 
continue for other fire agencies if consolidated. Still, consolidation may render many of 
190 GeoComm, King County, Washington PSAP Consolidation Assessment, 1–9 
191 Ibid., 1–12. 
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these duties impossible in the new model. If so, an alternate means of performing these 
secondary duties must be found. 
Political obstacles will manifest themselves in the single-discipline model just as 
they do in the “Optimal Model.” While fire disciplines may feel they take a backseat to 
law enforcement desires in the latter, it is likely that Valley Com will resist the decrease 
in call volume, which will come with an attendant decrease in funding from King County 
9-1-1due to its funding model. It will be difficult for Valley Com to view this as anything 
other than a transfer of revenue from Valley Com to the FAC. 
The tremendous gain of this new model is that the city of Seattle would not face 
the burden of creating a new city department, nor would it be required to abandon its 
newest PSAP, construct an all new PSAP, and train the civilian dispatchers necessary to 
operate it. Similarly, any reorganization of the King County Sheriff’s Office PSAP would 
have much less of an impact. Instead of having to support 12 new law enforcement 
agencies and 15 new fire agencies, representing almost 200,000 new 9-1-1 calls, and the 
attendant staffing and training in a new discipline (the Sherriff’s Office currently does not 
serve any fire agencies) that would be required, it would simply take on 12 law 
enforcement agencies and 125,000 additional calls. Whatever reorganization is required 
by the “optimum model,” the impact would be greatly reduced by the “Single-discipline 
Model.” 
Another political consideration is job loss. Under the GeoComm’s “Optimal 
Model,” disabled firefighters would be forced to retire and enter the state retirement 
system’s disability rolls (although this would not affect King County 9-1-1 funding). 
Under the single-discipline model,” firefighter/dispatcher numbers would likely increase, 
again at no cost to the King County 9-1-1 Program Office. While overall numbers of 
dispatchers would drop in King County, it would likely not affect employment for 
dispatchers. According to GeoComm’s numbers, “the region’s call taker staffing is 
currently understaffed by 83 positions.”192 
192 Ibid., 2–11. 
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4. Potential Effects on Interoperability 
The single-discipline plan would have an effect on different aspects of 
interoperability throughout the region. 
a. Voice and Data Interoperability 
Thanks to its regional radio system, King County already operates at a high level 
of voice interoperability. This would be greatly enhanced for King County’s 30 fire 
departments, which would share all communications with the FAC on a daily basis. 
These common communication protocols would pay dividends on mutual aid responses 
and large, multi-jurisdictional events. In terms of data interoperability, by consolidating 
12 PSAPs into seven the single-discipline model would reduce the number of CAD 
systems, easing the transition into King County’s planned regional CAD interoperability 
initiative. 
b. Inter-discipline (Fire/Police) Interoperability 
Unlike the GeoComm “optimum plan,” Seattle’s police and fire departments 
would maintain separate PSAPs. Thus, there would be no change in interoperability 
between the two agencies operationally from the status quo with implementation of the 
“Single-discipline Model,” and in fact there would be a reduction in police/fire 
interoperability when compared to the “optimum plan.” Outside the city of Seattle, there 
would be little intra-discipline interoperability. With the King County Sheriff’s Office 
PSAP and Valley Com having no fire agencies, operational interoperability between 
police and fire would not be improved for joint operations. 
c. Intra-discipline (Fire/Fire, Police/Police) Interoperability 
Like the GeoComm “optimum model,” Seattle and Valley Com would see little or 
no improvements to intra-disciplinary interoperability as a result of the “Single-discipline 
Model,” as their changes from the status quo are minimal. The King County Sheriff’s 
Office PSAP, by adding 12 law enforcement agencies, would significantly improve intra-
disciplinary interoperability among police agencies. 23 police agencies. In addition, one 
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of them with a countywide jurisdiction, would share communications, status, and location 
information for all of their units. 
Fire interoperability could be increased to its fullest potential by implementation 
of a single-discipline model (as would law enforcement in an ideal single-discipline 
model). Similar to the Spokane Fire Combined Communications Center and Phoenix 
Regional Communications models discussed in Chapter IV, all communications relating 
to fire would originate from a single source. The status and location of all fire resources 
countywide would be tracked at one entity. For routine incidents, the nearest unit or units 
could be dispatched regardless of jurisdictional boundaries. As an example, 145th Street 
is the north border of the city of Seattle. A fire occurring on the south side of the street 
generates an all-Seattle response, drawing from much of Seattle’s north end. The same 
fire on the north side of the street receives a response the Shoreline Fire Department. 
Both agencies responding in the single-discipline model would generate the same number 
of responding units, but they would get there more quickly. This represents the ultimate 
in intra-discipline interoperability—treating the many jurisdictions as one, large regional 
fire department, as exemplified by the Phoenix Regional Communications model. 
Medical emergencies would fare better as well. Currently, if all three of Seattle’s 
northernmost medic units are out of service on emergencies. A patient in the north end of 
the city would need to wait for a downtown medic unit, even though Shoreline has a 
medic unit much closer. Interoperability of this nature is operational common sense and 
provides better service to the taxpaying public. 
Large and complex incidents would also benefit from this concept. Requests for 
mutual aid would not need to be relayed to another PSAP. The Fire Alarm Center would 
have situational awareness for the entire county, and it could send needed resources from 
anywhere in the county as needed. This is particularly true of regional resources. 
Due to its size, the Seattle Fire Department manages several regional assets, 
including multiple fireboats, mass decontamination units, technical rescue teams, tactical 
air support personnel with equipment for rescue and equipment delivery, urban search 
and rescue caches, a mass ventilation unit, along with other such resources that smaller 
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departments do not have. These regional assets could be activated almost immediately 
due to the increased situational awareness afforded by having all county fire services 
under one roof. A summary of the advantages and disadvantages of the single-discipline 
model appear in Table 18. 
Table 18.   Advantages and disadvantages of single-discipline model compared to the status 
quo. 
ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES 
Number of PSAPs reduced from 12 to 7 Call transfers increase tremendously as WSP becomes a secondary PAP 
Higher staffing levels for NG9-1-1 
implementation 
Call transfers for fire/EMS services increase as all 
such calls go to a secondary PSAP 
Lower overall staffing requirements Smaller PSAPs feel disenfranchised 
Reduced installation and upkeep costs for NG-
911 technology Less local/agency control 
Increase in surge capacity Ancillary duties must be reassigned 
Redundant facility plan intact King County 9-1-1 finance model unaffected 
CAD interoperability upgraded Reduced inter-discipline interoperability 
No major new construction/remodels of PSAPs 
required  
Intra-discipline law enforcement interoperability 
increased   
Intra-discipline fire/EMS interoperability 
increased to complete countywide coordination  
 
5. Feasibility of the Fire Alarm Center Becoming a Countywide PSAP 
One of the major hurdles faced by GeoComm’s “Optimal Model” was that the 
city of Seattle would have the financial burden of building a new PSAP of sufficient size 
to facilitate police and fire dispatching under one roof. If the Fire Alarm Center is to be 
the focus of fire/ EMS 9-1-1 calls and dispatching for all of King County and not 
encounter the same costs as the “Optimal Model,” it would need to be operationally able 
to do so. An analysis of the Fire Alarm Center (FAC) operations could determine whether 
the FAC has such capability, as well as illuminate some features of the FAC that make it 
operationally unique among King County PSAPs. 
a. Facility 
Completed in 2008, the FAC is King County’s newest PSAP. Not only is the 
equipment new, but the building itself is constructed to be capable of withstanding an 
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earthquake load 50 percent higher than most buildings. These design specifications affect 
most components of the building, construction materials, and equipment specifications. 
To ensure the building remains operable after an earthquake, all critical building systems 
are designed to accommodate movement.193 
However, a state of the art facility is not enough if it does not possess enough 
capacity. To become a regional fire dispatch center, the FAC would have to be able to 
staff enough workstations to account for the increase from about 82,000 9-1-1 calls/year 
to more than 220,000—an increase of over 250 percent. Given that the FAC comfortably 
meets industry standards with the current staffing model of four dispatchers on the floor, 
it is reasonable to conclude that 10 workstations would need to be staffed to account for 
the extra call volume. The FAC was designed with such growth in mind. It currently has 
14 dispatcher workstations in place, without reconfiguring the center in any way. 
b. Firefighter/Dispatchers 
The Seattle Fire Department’s Fire Alarm Center has been providing dispatch 
services since 1890. It is one of the few fire-only PSAPs in Washington, and one of a 
small number of nationwide that still uses sworn firefighters as dispatchers. Seattle 
firefighters may apply for the position after completion of five years in the Operations 
(fire suppression) Division. Because of this, all FAC dispatchers are emergency medical 
technicians or certified paramedics. Proponents of firefighter dispatchers argue that the 
experience of firefighters in responding to fires, rescues, and medical emergencies add a 
dimension to 9-1-1 call receiving and radio communications that civilians could not.194 
While firefighters do not process calls any quicker than do civilian dispatchers, it can be 
argued that firefighter/dispatchers provide other, less tangible benefits. 
 
 
193 Fred Podesta, “Fire Facilities and Emergency Response Levy: Station 10—EOC/FAC,” 
seattle.gov, accessed May 23, 2014, http://www.seattle.gov/fleetsfacilities/firelevy/facilities/fs10/10.htm 
194 Sjoberg-Evashenk Consulting, Review of the Los Angeles Fire Department Dispatch Staffing and 
Special Duty Assignments, April 24, 2006, 
http://controller.lacity.org/stellent/groups/electedofficials/@ctr_contributor/documents/contributor_web_co
ntent/lacityp_008200.pdf, 15.  
 93 
                                                 
(1) Retention 
Civilian PSAPs nationwide are plagued by high vacancy rates, which nationally 
are at 20 percent.195 Turnover is high because dispatchers leave for less stressful jobs that 
do not require working nights and weekends, which means mandatory overtime and 
increases dissatisfaction.196 This crisis in retention of public safety dispatchers has 
ongoing since the early 1990s.197 NORCOM, a civilian PSAP in Bellevue, Washington, 
had a vacancy rate of 27.5 percent in 2012.198 ValleyCom, in Renton, Washington has 
fared better, with fluctuation between 9 percent and 7 percent over the past three years.199 
As a result, civilian centers are constantly in a hiring and training mode, and experience 
level suffers. The vacancy rate at the FAC is 0 percent, which keeps hiring and training 
costs lower. 
(2) Stress  
Dispatchers perform a complex and stressful function.200 Stressors cited include 
the responsibility to citizens and responders, job dissatisfaction, low pay, lack of 
promotional opportunities, and low status.201 This plays a large part in the industry’s 20 
percent vacancy rate.202 In addition, it also creates more mandatory overtime and hiring 
costs.203 While dispatchers at the FAC experience stress, it can be argued that the stress 
they feel is considerably less given the top civilian stressors listed earlier: their pay is 
195 Valley Communications Center, 2012 Annual Report, 15 
http://www.valleycom.org/docs/2012annualreport.pdf  
196 Judy Ronningen, “Help Wanted, and It’s a Matter of Life and Death: High-tech Competition 
Creates 911 Dispatcher Shortage on the Eastside,” Eastside Journal Online, September 14, 2000, 
http://www.eastsidejournal.com/sited/retr_story.pl/23212  
197 G. Miraglia, “Recruiting and Retaining Dispatchers beyond 10 Years,”APCO Bulletin #62 (1996, 
August): 96. 
198 North East King County Regional Public Safety Communication Agency, 2012 Annual Report 
(Bellevue, WA: North East King County Regional Public Safety Communication Agency), 
http://www.norcom.org/docs/misc/2012%20Annual%20Report%20Final.pdf, 35.  
199 Valley Communications Center, 2012 Annual Report, 15 
200 Tod Burke, “Dispatcher Stress,” in Protect Your Life!: A Health Handbook for Law Enforcement 
Professionals, ed. Davidson C. Umeh (Flushing, NY: Looseleaf Law Publications, 2006), 79  
201 Ibid., 81–82. 
202 Ronningen, “Help Wanted.” 
203 Ibid. 
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generally higher than civilian dispatchers,204 their promotional opportunities are the same 
as any other member of the fire department, and they are used to the responsibility for 
citizen and responder safety as experienced first responders. Firefighting is considered to 
be one of the nation’s most stressful occupations. After a minimum of five years in that 
capacity, firefighters that become dispatchers are moving to a position of less stress at the 
FAC.205 
(3) Street Experience  
Firefighter dispatchers have spent time as response agents, so the argument, 
though difficult to quantify, is that they make better dispatchers since they know both 
sides of the dispatcher/responder relationship. Proponents of firefighter dispatchers assert 
that they make better EMS dispatchers because of their EMT training as well as the fact 
that they actively practiced emergency medical care as first responders.206 Additionally, 
they also indicate that firefighters make better fire dispatchers because of their experience 
responding to and communicating on the radio at fires.207 
This experience is discounted by proponents of civilian dispatchers. They assert 
that modern emergency medical dispatching (EMD) protocols, which provide medically-
approved pre-arrival instructions designed to be delivered by phone by civilian 
dispatchers, obviate the need for dispatchers with actual emergency medical 
experience.208 
In disagreement with this is Dr. Leonard Cobb, co-founder of Seattle’s Medic One 
program, which is widely regarded as the number one program nationally in pre-hospital 
emergency care209 Cobb states,  
204 Sjoberg-Evashenk Consulting, Review of the Los Angeles Fire Department Dispatch Staffing,11  
205 Mary Rose Roberts, “Firefighting the Second-Most Stressful Job in the Nation, White Paper 
Reports,” Fire Chief (2012, January), http://Firechief.Com/Health-Safety/Ar/Firefighter-Stressful-Job-
20120105 
206 Sjoberg-Evashenk Consulting, Review of the Los Angeles Fire Department Dispatch Staffing, 13–
14. 
207 Ibid. 
208 Ibid., 15. 
209 Robert Davis, “Doctors in Charge Rarely Call the Shots,” USA Today, July 29, 2003. 
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Our utilization of experienced EMS responders is more to the point than 
EMT [training] per se. Little doubt in my mind that our dispatchers are 
better equipped to do an excellent job, compared to inexperienced 
individuals not previously involved in EMS.210  
This is corroborated by a 2002 study done in Europe, which concluded: 
What information is attended to and how the information is considered, is 
dependent upon the schemata that dispatchers have. These schemata are 
made up of their ambulance training, medical and road experience. The 
schemata enable dispatchers to recognize patterns in the presented cues 
that help them diagnose the situation.211  
Wong and Blandford also offer an opinion: 
Situational cues that violate these expectations set off alarm bells that 
relate to what dispatchers refer to as 6th sense. This is often verbalized by 
the dispatchers as ‘it just doesn’t look right’ and highlight the value of 
experience in this job.212 
In that vein, as described in After Action Report on the Response to the September 
11, during the response to the Pentagon on 9/11, a firefighter named Terry Theodore was 
on light duty on September 11. He was assigned to a temporary communications 
technician position at the Emergency Communications Center (ECC) in Arlington, 
Virginia. Many responders commented on the value of having someone with his 
operational background and knowledge of fireground and ICS activities at the ECC.213  
c. Dispatch Operations 
The dispatch floor operates on a four-platoon system, with each platoon rotating 
through a 24-hour shift. The shift parallels the Operations (fire suppression) Division’s 
24-hour shifts, so each platoon of dispatchers works with the same fire companies each 
shift. Each platoon at the FAC is supervised by a lieutenant/dispatcher, who reports to the 
210 Leonard Cobb, interview with author, July 9, 2013. 
211 Raanan Lipshitz and Ben Shaul, “Schemata and Mental Models in Recognition-primed Decision 
Making,” in Naturalistic Decision Making, ed. Caroline E. Zsambok and Gary Klein (Mahwah, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997), 293–303. 
212 William Wong and Ann Blandford, Analysing Ambulance Dispatcher Decision Making: Trialing 
Emergent Themes, UCL Interaction Centre, 2002, http://www.uclic.ucl.ac.uk/annb/docs/wwabfh2002.pdf, 
6. 
213 Titan Systems Corporation, After Action Report, A-35. 
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administrative captain. In addition to the lieutenants, each platoon is staffed with six 
firefighter/dispatchers.   
In terms of operational model, most PSAPs divide dispatch duties by function: 
supervisors, radio, call taker, and dispatcher. This method utilizes call takers to receive 
and process incoming 9-1-1 calls, interrogate the caller, and choose the appropriate 
resource types to respond to the incident. Call takers forward the incident into a queue for 
a dispatcher, who selects the unit(s) to respond to the incident and dispatches them. The 
radio position is the point of contact for all units on duty and maintains radio 
communication with them. The supervisor manages all aspects of activity on the dispatch 
floor. 
At the FAC, the call taker and dispatcher positions are combined. The call taker 
processes the 9-1-1 call, chooses the response type, and selects and sends the units on the 
alarm. The radio function and supervisor functions remain the same, although the 
lieutenant will take overflow 9-1-1 calls if all call takers are engaged. 
Standard staffing is four dispatchers on the floor and three off the floor, according 
to an established schedule. Because they work 24-hour shifts, those dispatchers that are 
off the floor are able to be summoned back to the floor for large incidents or a sudden 
increase in call volume. Since all FAC dispatchers are trained in radio, dispatching. and 
call taking functions, when recalled to the floor for help they can assume whatever 
position is necessary. Such surge capacity is unusual in PSAPs that do not work 24-hour 
shifts. PSAPs that operate a 24-hour shift feature the least amount of employee 
turnover.214 
Critics concede the greater flexibility of the 24-hour shift but note that if such 
flexibility was absolutely necessary that most dispatch centers would employ it; most do 
not, including the eight large cities that the Los Angeles Fire Department uses as 
comparison cities.215 A consulting firm hired by Los Angeles maintains that peak-time 
scheduling utilizing an 8, 10 or 12-hour shift assigns more dispatchers on duty at the 
214 Ibid. 
215 Ibid., 14. 
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busiest times. The firm does not cite studies, indicating that most emergencies requiring 
upstaffing occur at peak times, but refers to the infrequency of such events as a mitigating 
factor.216 
Shift work can also cause sleep issues, safety concerns, and can impact family 
activities, such as getting children to school, especially if the spouse has a job with a 
typical schedule.217 Some civilian centers do operate 24-hour shifts, and in some cases 
receive a pay differential of up to 14 percent for the inconvenience.218 Regardless of shift 
model, since PSAPs operate 24-hours a day, 7 days per week, 365 days per year, shift 
work of some kind is required.  
At the FAC, firefighter/dispatchers must have a minimum of five years of 
experience as a firefighter in the field before applying to be a dispatcher. For those five 
years, they work a 24-hour shift schedule. In fact, they essentially volunteered for shift 
work when they accepted employment at the fire department. Thus, Seattle firefighters 
transitioning to the FAC have no schedule adjustment to make, nor do their families; any 
adjustment to shift work was made at least five years prior. For them, the 24-hour shift is 
normal. Furthermore, the 24-hour shifts at the FAC also match the department’s 
Operations Division shifts, which builds teamwork and a sense of camaraderie.219 
d. Dispatch Pool 
An aspect of operations that appears to be unique to the FAC is the dispatcher 
pool. The pool consists of 20 firefighters, trained as dispatchers, who are not assigned to 
the FAC. Upon completion of dispatcher training, they are returned to their operational 
assignment on an engine, ladder, or medic unit. To maintain their dispatching skills, they 
work one 24-hour shift at the FAC every six weeks. This gives the Seattle Fire 
Department great flexibility. In a disaster, pandemic, or other homeland security crisis, up 
216 Ibid. 
217 Peter Finn, “The Effects of Shift Work on the Lives of Employees,” Monthly Labor Review (1981, 
October), 32–33, www.bls.gov/opub/mir/1981/10/art5full.pdf 
218 Mike Scott, “Dispatch Center Scheduling Options: From 8’s to 24’s and Everything in Between,” 
9-1-1 Magazine, June 2003, 20–27. 
219 Ibid. 
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to 71 percent of FAC dispatchers could became incapacitated and continuity of 
operations would be preserved. If such a situation called for additional personnel, the 
staff of the FAC can be nearly doubled in a short time. When a dispatcher retires or is on 
extended disability, a fully trained replacement is available immediately. 
e. Command and Control 
Inadequate fireground communication is repeatedly cited as a contributing factor 
in the safety of emergency personnel and may contribute to injuries or deaths of 
firefighters, rescue workers, and civilians.220 To bridge that gap, significant incidents 
such as fires, mass casualty incidents (MCI), and hazardous materials incidents are 
assigned a radio position specific to that incident. Firefighter/dispatchers use their 
experience at such incidents to prompt incident commanders for incident needs and 
assemble resources they anticipate will be required. They also insert themselves into 
incidents, ensuring that critical communications that go unacknowledged are repeated to 
the incident commander. As an arm of the Seattle Fire Department, the FAC makes 
decisions regarding citywide coverage, what units may travel where, and what units 
should relocate to ensure engine, ladder, and EMS coverage is maintained. 
f. Expense 
Firefighter/dispatchers are more expensive than civilian dispatchers.221 While the 
lower salaries of civilian dispatchers make them less expensive, it is not without 
unintended consequences. According to Francis Holt, less attractive salaries mean less 
quality candidates in the profession:222  
I loved my job as a fire alarm dispatcher, but I don’t do it anymore. I got 
married, had kids, and had a choice: work several jobs as far into the 
220 Adam Thiel and Hollis Standbaugh, Special Report: Improving Firefighter Communications 
(Washington, DC: United States Fire Administration, 1999), 
http://www.usfa.fema.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/tr-099.pdf  
221 Ibid., 11. 
222 Francis Holt, “How to Ruin a Dispatcher,” Fire Engineering 145, no. 9 (1992, September): 112. 
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future as I could see, or go to school and learn to do something else. Like 
many talented people with whom I worked, I opted for the latter.223 
The 20 percent industry vacancy rate corroborates Holt’s statement, as does a 
2005 Association of Public Safety Communications Officials (APCO) study which states 
that 58 percent of the turnover is due to low pay.224 As noted previously, dispatcher 
salaries are not a factor in King County 9-1-1’s finances. 
 
223 Ibid. 
224 Mary Jean Taylor, Veronica Gardner, and Barbara McCombs, Staffing and Retention in Public 
Safety Communications Centers (Denver, CO: Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials and 
Denver Research Institute, 2005), 7. 
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VI. FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
A. PROBLEM SPACE 
The research question that informed this thesis was: “To further interoperability, 
should PSAPs discipline be a primary factor in PSAP consolidation?” PSAP 
consolidation has been increasing in the last five years, primarily as a cost saving 
measure, and simple geographic proximity, rather than discipline, has been the driving 
factor. This thesis is not intended to promote nor dissuade consolidation or to serve as a 
clearinghouse for all issues that surround consolidation such as governance, oversight, or 
politics. Consolidation is largely a function of the will of county government, and it will 
continue to be a fact of life for PSAPs to consider.  
This thesis is intended to address how consolidation should occur, given that is 
underway. In public safety, it is important to never lose sight of the overall goal—
maintaining the safety of the public at the highest level. As stated by GeoComm in its 
consolidation assessment report for King County, Washington: “The primary goal of any 
consolidation effort should be to enhance public safety in the region. Service 
enhancements should be clear and immediate.”225 It is to that end that these findings, 
conclusions, and recommendations are presented. 
B. FINDINGS 
1. Police, Fire and Law Enforcement Dispatching are Discrete and 
Separate Functions 
The telecommunicators positions of call taker, dispatcher, and radio operator as 
they relate to fire, law enforcement, and EMS are similar to the casual observer, but they 
share almost as many differences as the disciplines they serve. Law enforcement 
dispatching generates most of its responses to incidents that are over. In addition, many 
of those responses are not initiated by 9-1-1 callers but by patrolling police officers that 
generate the response themselves; this creates a flurry of activity on the radio.  
225 GeoComm, King County, Washington PSAP Consolidation Assessment, 6–18. 
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Law enforcement call volume is higher than that of fire or EMS, and it typically 
requires the stacking of calls (queuing calls for units to respond to later). Generally, the 
incidents are short lived, often simply generating a report. Dispatchers must supply 
information to field officers by searching databases and records. 
Fire dispatchers experience lower call volumes, but nearly every call is for an 
ongoing emergency. Consequently, no calls are stacked. Unlike police dispatching, fire 
dispatching involves different types of units with unique capabilities. There are fewer 
responses, but they typically involve multiple units. Some alarms may last for hours, and 
radio operators must monitor transmissions and adhere to a rigid command structure and 
communication style. In addition, excessive background noise and the effects of personal 
protective gear often hamper radio transmissions. Very few fire responses are generated 
from the field. 
The third type, EMS dispatching, like fire, is typically for emergent situations. 
Responses of more than two units are rare, but dispatchers must adhere to strict 
dispatching protocols to identify life-threatening events in order to send the proper 
response. 
While dispatchers across the country can and do perform all three types of 
dispatching, there is a case to be made for skill specialization. While few sources directly 
deal with dispatcher specialization in fire or police dispatching, in a paper for the 
National Fire Academy Robert Junell noted that specialization enhances productivity and 
that exposure to variety has a nonlinear influence on productivity (i.e., “too much 
variety” can impede learning). This was tempered by his finding that a proper balance 
between specialization and exposure to a variety leads to the highest productivity.226 
Studies in other fields related to job and skill specialization have noted a 
maximized rate of return by utilizing specialized skills as intensively as possible 
generally in labor.227 In contrast, a 1983 study of the Japanese banking industry recorded 
productivity improves with job specialization over the course of a single day; however, 
226 Junell, “Consolidation Versus Separate Fire.” 
227 Rosen, “Specialization and Human Capital,” 49. 
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examined across a number of days variety improved productivity.228 However, 
productivity in dispatching is of questionable value, as nothing is produced per se by 
PSAPs. Calls are received and dispatched as rapidly as possible as they come in, and 
intuitively it would seem that more experience in a particular dispatch discipline would 
increase proficiency. Even some multi-discipline PSAPs, such as Denver 911 and the 
Chicago Emergency Communication Center, have separate career paths for dispatchers in 
each discipline. Given that within each discipline, there are several discrete dispatching 
functions (call taker, dispatcher, radio operator), rotation among these tasks could 
potentially alleviate the problems inherent in discipline specialization. 
2. The Prevailing Wisdom Regarding Interoperability Does Not Reflect 
the Needs of Responders 
Simply put, the prevailing wisdom on interoperability is that all disciplines need 
the ability to communicate with each other by radio. It is echoed in the literature from the 
federal to the local level. The story of the NYPD helicopter warning of the tower’s 
imminent collapse at 9/11 is oft cited as proof of this. However, this anecdote does not 
provide the necessary context for the debate.  
First, at 9/11 and elsewhere in the literature, examples can be found of 
communications saturation at incidents. The transmissions become so numerous, even 
within one discipline, that adding the rest would exacerbate communications problems, 
not enhance them. In fact, at the Pentagon on 9/11, not only were police and fire 
communications separate, but even within those disciplines communications were 
detached—on the law enforcement side, by function, and on the fire side by geography. 
Communications were broken down by what was necessary for certain responders for 
situational awareness; the last thing needed was for all disciplines of responders to be on 
one channel. 
Second, the disciplines are separated for a reason: even when working toward the 
same ultimate goal on a given incident, they are rarely assigned to the same objectives or 
tasks. At an incident, firefighters may engage in fire suppression, police in investigation, 
228 Staats, and Gino. “Specialization and Variety in Repetitive Tasks,” 1141–1159. 
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and EMS in patient treatment. All of these move the incident forward to mitigation, but 
none particularly relates to the others, nor is communications regarding the tasks 
necessary for the situational awareness of the others. 
Third, the organizational and institutional knowledge is unique to each discipline. 
Law enforcement and fire do not speak or understand the same language, and the 
nomenclature and unit signatures of the disciplines are as different as the disciplines 
themselves. 
3. Inter-discipline Interoperability at Incidents is Best Achieved through 
Unified Command 
While each discipline at a major incident is working toward the same ultimate 
goal of incident mitigation, the tasks and tactics employed by each discipline are most 
often discipline specific. Since tasks and tactics are discrete, the need for tactical 
communication between disciplines is obviated. Communication at the strategic level is 
needed to ensure that these discrete tasks are coordinated as part of an overall strategy to 
complete incident objectives. Organizational structures exist to solve the problem that 
voice interoperability cannot—namely, the incident command system. It is through 
unified command under the NIMS system that situational awareness and coordination of 
objectives between disciplines are established. Discipline commanders with decision-
making authority communicate with each other face-to-face at the command post. Those 
commanders then ensure that all within their discipline are operating in a coordinated 
effort according to the overall incident action plan. 
4. Intra-discipline Interoperability is of Greater Value than Inter-
discipline Interoperability 
While police and fire may not speak the same language or have the same 
objectives at an incident, firefighters and police absolutely need to work as seamlessly as 
possible with firefighters and police from their respective disciplines from different 
jurisdictions. At a regional or homeland security scale event, units of the same discipline 
from different jurisdictions may well be working together on the same task or objective, 
and interoperability will be crucial to their success. This is not only true of voice 
 104 
interoperability but functional interoperability. Building functional intra-discipline 
interoperability between agencies during routine events enhances operational 
interoperability at larger, more complex events.  
5. PSAP Practices Reflect the Importance of Intra-discipline 
Interoperability 
All PSAPs surveyed for this thesis have dutifully complied with the prevailing 
wisdom on interoperability and possess the capability to have all disciplines utilize voice 
interoperability with each other. However, in practice, they seldom make use of that 
capability. While all PSAPs report that intra-discipline interoperability is exercised 
frequently, the inter-discipline capacity for interoperability is rarely exploited. This 
reflects their relative importance—the means exist to make it happen, but the need is not 
enough to drive use. Even PSAPs that do make use of the capability for police and fire to 
communicate directly keep tactical communications by different disciplines on different 
channels. 
6. Single-discipline PSAPs Increase Intra-discipline Interoperability, 
Multi-discipline PSAPs Increase Inter-discipline Interoperability 
Amalgamating PSAPs via a single-discipline model increases intra-discipline 
interoperability by consolidating the unit status and location, voice communications, data, 
and regional assets of an entire discipline under the command and control of a single 
entity. Amalgamating PSAPs via a multi-discipline model increases inter-discipline 
interoperability by consolidating the unit status and location, voice communications, data, 
and regional assets of all disciplines under the command and control of a single entity.  
The converse is also true; single-discipline PSAPs reduce inter-discipline 
interoperability by separating the command and control functions of the disciplines. 
Multi-discipline PSAPs decrease intra-discipline interoperability by reducing the 
geographic footprint of its effects. Essentially, the gain in interoperability comes at the 
cost of true regionalization for either discipline. This is only true if the FCC best practice 
is followed regarding two-PSAPs per geographic region; however, to ignore that 
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recommendation would mean trading away a proximal back-up for a mission critical 
component of command and control (the PSAP) for interoperability. 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
The PSAP’s role in interoperability should be viewed through the framework of 
the findings above. As noted in Chapter II, the function of the PSAP is not only to receive 
9-1-1 calls for assistance. PSAPs also: 
• Serve as the hub for all communications activities of each of the agencies 
they serve 
• Track unit status and location 
• Ensure that jurisdictions maintain adequate protection through distribution 
of units 
• Monitor radio communications of ongoing incidents 
Given these missions, which all revolve around command, control, and coordination, the 
interoperability benefits of each model of PSAP consolidation can be determined by 
analyzing the effects on interoperability of a consolidated multi-discipline PSAP and a 
consolidated single-discipline PSAP.  
1. Analysis of Each Model’s Impact on Interoperability 
The analysis is based on eight aspects of interoperability affected by the model of 
consolidation, and it presumes compliance with the FCC’s proximal back-up facility 
recommendation (a minimum of two PSAPs in any region). The effect of each model of 
consolidation on each aspect of interoperability is rated on two criteria: net effect 
(positive, negative or none) and degree of effect (high, moderate, low or none). 
a. Inter-discipline Voice Communication Ability 
Since all agencies served by a PSAP enjoy a common hub of communications, 
voice interoperability is improved. Respective to model, the effects were analyzed as 
follows: 
• Multi-discipline—By combining disciplines within a PSAP, 
communications are facilitated between disciplines. Net effect is positive. 
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Because the agencies are distributed between two PSAPs, the degree of 
effect is moderate. 
• Single-discipline—By separating disciplines by PSAP, communications 
are not facilitated between disciplines. Net effect is negative. Because no 
other discipline is present at the communications hub, despite the fact that 
patching could be effected, the degree of effect is high. 
b. Intra-discipline Voice Communication Ability 
Since all agencies served by a PSAP enjoy a common hub of communications, 
voice interoperability is improved. By model, the effects were judged as follows: 
• Multi-discipline—By having multiple agencies within each discipline, 
communications are facilitated. Net effect is positive. Because the 
agencies are distributed between two PSAPs, the degree of effect is 
moderate.  
• Single-discipline—By having all agencies of a single-discipline under one 
roof, the Net effect is positive. Because this allows complete intra-
discipline voice interoperability, the Degree of Effect is high. 
c. Inter-discipline Voice Communication SOP’s 
Communications protocols are standardized by the PSAP for all agencies within 
disciplines, which means all agencies within that discipline are using the same 
terminology and conventions. This enhances the capabilities of voice interoperability and 
functional interoperability. 
• Multi-discipline—Because different disciplines have radically different 
communications protocols, the net effect is none; the degree of effect is 
none.  
• Single-discipline—Because different disciplines have radically different 
communications protocols, the net effect is none. The degree of effect is 
also none.  
d. Intra-discipline Voice Communication SOP’s 
Communications protocols are standardized by the PSAP for all agencies within 
disciplines, which means all agencies within that discipline are using the same 
terminology and conventions. This enhances the capabilities of voice interoperability and 
functional interoperability. 
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• Multi-discipline—By bringing multiple agencies of the same discipline 
under one PSAP, the net effect is positive. Because a portion of those 
agencies is served by a different PSAP, the degree of effect is moderate.  
• Single-discipline—By having all agencies of a single-discipline under a 
common set of communications SOPs, functional interoperability is 
enhanced, and the net effect is positive. Because this allows complete 
intra-discipline voice interoperability, the degree of effect is high. 
e. Inter-discipline Unit Location/Status 
The location and status of units is tracked at the PSAP and provides a snapshot of 
resources and capabilities available to respond, as well as an indication of responder 
coverage of the area served by the PSAP. 
• Multi-discipline—Because the response capabilities of all disciplines are 
monitored, the net effect is positive. The disciplines have different 
missions and thus the coverage is discipline specific—the number of fire 
units available is unrelated to police presence and vice-versa. 
Additionally, the area overseen by the other PSAP reduces the area 
monitored. The degree of effect is low.  
• Single-discipline—Since only one discipline is present at the PSAP, no 
information on the other is monitored. Net effect is negative. Because the 
disciplines have different missions and thus the coverage is discipline 
specific, the number of fire units available is unrelated to police presence 
and vice-versa. Hence, the degree of effect is low. 
f. Intra-discipline Unit Location/Status 
The location and status of units is tracked at the PSAP, providing a snapshot of 
resources and capabilities available to respond, as well as an indication of responder 
coverage of the area served by the PSAP. 
• Multi-discipline—Multiple agencies that represent each discipline are 
monitored, increasing situational awareness within that discipline. The net 
effect is positive. Because the agencies available are split with another 
PSAP, the degree of effect is moderate.  
• Single-discipline—All agencies within the discipline are monitored. Net 
effect is positive. A regional picture of response capability is presented. 
The degree of effect is high. 
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g. Dispatcher Skill Specialization 
Fire, EMS, and law enforcement dispatching are discrete functions that require 
the development of different skill sets and abilities. 
• Multi-discipline—Although some multi-discipline PSAPs separate 
dispatcher career paths by discipline, it is not the most common model. 
Skill specialization would not be enhanced. The net effect is negative. 
Because dispatchers nation-wide have demonstrated the ability to 
successfully manage all disciplines of dispatching, the degree of effect is 
low.  
• Single-discipline—By dispatching only a single discipline, skill 
specialization would be enhanced. Net effect is positive. Because 
dispatchers nationwide have demonstrated the ability successfully manage 
all disciplines of dispatching, the degree of effect is low.  
h. Effect on Regionalization 
Interoperability has more impact when achieved over a wider geographic 
footprint. 
• Multi-discipline—Since consolidation increases the geographic area of 
service of a PSAP, the net effect is positive. The nature of the model is 
such that agencies and disciplines divide a given geographic area. The 
degree of effect is moderate.  
• Single-discipline—Since consolidation increases the geographic area of 
service of a PSAP, the net effect is positive. By separating the PSAPs by 
discipline, interoperability within disciplines covers the entire geographic 
footprint of both PSAPs. The degree of effect is high.  
2. Interoperability Impact Matrix 
Both models have a positive impact on interoperability, which is not surprising 
given that consolidation in and of itself will increase interoperability.229 However, the 
level of impact is different. In the matrix in Table 19, the interoperability benefits of each 
aspect are identified graphically by consolidation model. Positive impacts are green, and 
negative impacts are red. The level of impact is indicated by a plus sign for high impact, 
a minus sign for low impact, and no symbol for moderate impact.  
229 Womack, “Economies of Scale,” 8. 
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The findings of this thesis indicate that some aspects of interoperability have 
greater value than others. Specifically, intra-discipline interoperability is of greater 
import than inter-discipline interoperability. The PSAPs surveyed that possess enormous 
capacity for inter-discipline interoperability do not exercise it for a variety of reasons that 
ultimately boil down to a lack of advantage in doing so. 
Re-examining the interoperability impact matrix through this framework yields 
the following diagram (Table 20), in which the impacts of each model on intra-discipline 








Highlighting the matrix in this manner demonstrates that, while both models 
enhance interoperability, the single-discipline model supplies the greatest positive impact 
to interoperability in the areas of most value. The multi-discipline model shows more 
areas of improvement, but the gains are modest. The aspects in which the single-
discipline model has a negative impact are in the areas of inter-discipline interoperability; 
the very areas that surveyed PSAPs do not exercise in spite of great capacity to do so. 
3. Conclusion 
The analysis above indicates that PSAPs, which control communications and 
resource management, are better suited to do so as single-discipline entities with the 
ability to effect interoperability on a regional level, than as multi-discipline entities, 
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which cannot. The opportunity to create regional response capability and resource 
management among police and fire departments should not be understated. 
This conclusion comes with qualifiers. All things being equal, the research 
suggests that separating PSAPs by discipline promotes the most important aspects of 
interoperability; however, all things are rarely equal. There are political, governmental, 
and monetary restraints that affect consolidation in ways that may make the best choice 
unavailable. 
In fact, the best choice to increase interoperability across the entire spectrum 
would be a single, large PSAP that did fire, law enforcement, and EMS dispatching for 
the entire region. As noted, the FCC recommendation for a proximal back-up facility 
could be satisfied by having the PSAP for the adjacent region situated nearby. The 
amount of planning, money, and political capital involved in such a scenario makes it 
highly unlikely to come to fruition, and again, would the gains in inter-discipline 
interoperability be worth the effort required to attain them? Given the coordination and 
political maneuvering required, it would be much easier to attain two regional PSAPs 
separated by discipline within a single governmental jurisdiction.. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the findings and conclusions above, the following recommendations are 
proffered: 
A Two-PSAP, Single-discipline Model Should be Part of Any PSAP 
Consolidation Assessment. Typically, consolidation efforts begin with a feasibility 
assessment and planning document. If a single-discipline model is not considered at this 
stage, it will not be a part of the final planning document. 
If Conditions are Favorable, a Two-PSAP, Single-discipline Model Should be 
implemented. If the political, governmental, and financial environment will support it, 
consolidation should occur with a two-PSAP, single-discipline model. This will 
maximize the most important aspects of interoperability, satisfy the FCC best practice 
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regarding proximal back-up and provide consolidation benefits consistent with 
consolidation irrespective of discipline. 
Regional Intra-disciplinary Interoperability Should Be a Goal of Consolidation. If 
the political, governmental, and financial environment will not support a two-PSAP, 
single-discipline model, then attempts should be made to facilitate regionalization of a 
discipline to the extent possible. If three or four PSAPs are the extent of consolidation 
(see Chapter V), one of those PSAPs should be police or fire specific. Additionally, it 
should serve all agencies from that discipline in the geographic area of consolidation to 
achieve interoperability within at least one of the disciplines. 
1. Recommendations for Further Research 
The subject areas of interoperability and PSAP consolidation provide 
opportunities for further research. Further study in both areas have potential to provide 
significant operational enhancements and financial savings. 
a. Increase Survey Sample Size 
Due to constraints placed upon research involving human research subjects by the 
Office of Management and Budget, only nine PSAPs were surveyed. Broadening the 
research by obtaining a bigger sample size would present an opportunity to validate or 
refute the findings in this thesis. 
b. Continue Studying Perceived Wisdom on Interoperability 
The concept that every responder must be able to communicate with every other 
responder, regardless of discipline, has driven policy decisions in the United States since 
shortly after the 9/11 Commission released its report.230 This concept may not be as 
worthwhile as it intuitively appears based on actual practice, and it is worthy of further 
examination in light of the conclusions in this thesis. 
 
 
230 Timmons, “Radio Interoperability,” 77. 
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c. How Big is too Big? 
There is limited literature on PSAP consolidation in general. While some research 
suggests that consolidation can provide benefits, at what point does consolidation result 
in an entity that is too large? In Israel, the Magen David Adom provides emergency 
medical services. It is dispatched from a centralized system consisting of one national 
dispatch center, which shares full interoperability with 11 smaller regional dispatch 
centers.231 This provides great interoperability benefits, particularly during mass casualty 
incident (MCI) events. The regional centers handle routine calls, while all calls related to 
the MCI are routed to the national dispatch center.232 In this way, all information 
pertaining to an ongoing event is collected by the same entity that tracks resources 
assigned to that event, which enhances situational awareness. Responses to routine 
incidents can carry on uninterrupted. 
Of course, this practice is predicated upon Israel’s size and its nationalized public 
safety agencies. In contrast to Israel, a nation about the size and population of New 
Jersey,233 the United States is vast in area and has a population of 317 million.234 While 
Israel has one national police department, the United States has more than 18,000; each is 
independent from the others and subject to laws and practices governing its 
jurisdiction.235 The scope and government model of the United States makes nationalized 
dispatch centers unlikely to work. Whatever benefits consolidation may provide, the size 
of a PSAP may reach the point of diminishing returns with respect to those benefits. 
Research into where that point lies would be of benefit. 
 
231 Michael Peddle, “Mass Casualty Incident Preparedness: Lessons learned from Israeli preparedness 
and surge response for MCI,” CAEP, June 2012, 
http://caep.ca/sites/default/files/caep/files/caep_2012_1.pdf 
232 Ibid. 
233 “State Population by Rank, 2013,” infoplease.com, accessed March 9, 2014, 
http://www.infoplease.com/us/states/population-by-rank.html 
234 “U.S. and World Population Clock,” www.census.gov, accessed March 9, 2014, 
https://www.census.gov/popclock/ 
235 Nadav Morag, “Self-Study Course: Homeland Security in Israel,” Naval Postgraduate School, 
August 2009, https://www.chds.us/courses/course/view.php?id=342.  
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APPENDIX. PSAP SURVEY 
This survey was sent electronically in two parts to nine PSAP directors or 
Operations Managers. Participant comments at the end of the survey were encouraged. 
 





NOTE: You will be identified by name, title and PSAP affiliation in thesis citations.  
 
 





1) TYPE OF PSAP (Place X in the appropriate box): 
 Primary PSAP 
 Secondary PSAP 
 
2) NUMBER OF AGENCIES SERVED: 
 
Note: For law enforcement agencies, please count only truly independent agencies. 
For example, if your county sheriff contracts services for a jurisdiction, and sheriff’s 
deputies serve as the police officers in that town (regardless of uniform or car 
marking), do not count this as a separate agency.  
 Law Enforcement 
 Fire 





3) EMERGENCY CALL VOLUME FOR 2013: 








PART III: PSAP OPERATIONS 
 
SECTION 1: Please answer the following questions about employees at your PSAP 
  
4) Call takers/dispatchers are: 

























Comments (if needed): 
 
 
SECTION 2: Skip to Section 3 if your PSAP is single-discipline (Law Enforcement 
only OR Fire only) 
 
8) Which best describes your call taking operations: 
 Call takers will process any call they answer regardless if it is for a Fire, EMS or Law Enforcement problem 
 Calls are answered by Law Enforcement dispatchers, and transferred to a Fire or EMS call taker if it is a Fire or EMS problem 
 Other (explain in comments) 
 
SECTION 3: Skip to Part III if your PSAP is multi-discipline (Law Enforcement 
AND Fire) 
 
9) Which best describes your call taking operations: 
 Primary PSAP: 9-1-1 calls of all types are answered, and transferred to another PSAP if they require the services of another discipline 
 Secondary PSAP: Calls are transferred from another PSAP if they require the services of our discipline 
 Other (explain in comments) 
 










PART III: CAD INTEROPERABILITY 
 
10) Which best describes your CAD model: 
 All agencies served at my PSAP are dispatched from the same CAD system 
 Different disciplines (police, fire) served at this PSAP are dispatched from different CAD systems 
 Different agencies served at this PSAP are dispatched from different CAD systems 
 Other (explain in comments) 
 
Comments (if needed): 
 
 
11) Which best describes your CAD model (Check all that apply): 
 Units from all agencies served have their location and status presented at all CAD workstations 
 Units from different disciplines have their location and status presented at different CAD workstations 
 Units from different agencies have their location and status presented at different CAD workstations 
 Other (explain in comments) 
 
Comments (if needed): 
 
 
PART IV: RADIO INTEROPERABILITY 
 
SECTION 1: SKIP TO SECTION 2 IF YOUR PSAP DOES NOT SERVE ANY 
FIRE AGENCIES 
 
12) Do all Fire agencies served by your PSAP share radio interoperability? 
 Yes, radios are compatible/same system 
 Yes, through patching 
 No 
 




13) Do all Fire agencies served by your PSAP share radio interoperability with 
Fire agencies served by other PSAPs? 
 Yes, radios are compatible/same system 
 Yes, through patching 
 Not sure 
 No 
 
14) Do the Fire and Law Enforcement agencies served by your PSAP share radio 
interoperability with each other? 
 Yes, radios are compatible/same system 
 Yes, through patching 
 No 
 N/A—PSAP does not serve any Law Enforcement agencies 
 
Comments (if needed): 
 
15) Do the Fire agencies served by your PSAP share radio interoperability with 
Law Enforcement agencies served by other PSAPs? 
 Yes, radios are compatible/same system 
 Yes, through patching 










SECTION 2: SKIP TO SECTION 3 IF YOUR PSAP DOES NOT SERVE ANY 
LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 
 
16) Do all Law Enforcement agencies served by your PSAP share radio 
interoperability? 
 Yes, radios are compatible/same system 
 Yes, through patching 
 No 
 
Comments (if needed): 
 
17) Do the Law Enforcement agencies served by your PSAP share radio 
interoperability with Law Enforcement agencies served by other PSAPs? 
 Yes, radios are compatible/same system 
 Yes, through patching 
 Not sure 
 No 
 
Comments (if needed): 
 
18) Do the Fire and Law Enforcement agencies served by your PSAP share radio 
interoperability with each other? 
 Yes, radios are compatible/same system 
 Yes, through patching 
 No 
 N/A—PSAP does not serve any Fire agencies 
 





19) Do the Law Enforcement agencies served by your PSAP share radio 
interoperability with Fire agencies served by other PSAPs? 
 Yes, radios are compatible/same system 




SECTION 3: SKIP THIS SECTION IF YOUR PSAP DOES NOT SERVE ANY 
THIRD SERVICE EMS AGENCIES (i.e. EMS ONLY ACGENCIES—SKIP IF 
FIRE PROVIDES EMS SERVICES) 
 
20) Do all EMS agencies served by your PSAP share radio interoperability? 
 Yes, radios are compatible/same system 
 Yes, through patching 
 No 
 
Comments (if needed): 
 
 
21) Do the EMS and Fire agencies served by your PSAP share radio 
interoperability with each other? 
 Yes, radios are compatible/same system 
 Yes, through patching 
 No 
 N/A – PSAP does not serve any Fire agencies 
 








22) Do the EMS and Law Enforcement agencies served by your PSAP share 
radio interoperability with each other? 
 Yes, radios are compatible/same system 
 Yes, through patching 
 No 
 N/A – PSAP does not serve any Law Enforcement agencies 
 
Comments (if needed): 
 
 
PART V: OPERATIONAL INTRA-DISCIPLINE INTEROPERABILITY 
 
SECTION 2: SKIP TO SECTION 3 IF YOUR PSAP DOES NOT SERVE ANY 
FIRE AGENCIES OR IF YOUR PSAP SERVES A SINGLE FIRE AGENCY 
 
23) Which best describes your model for coordination among Fire agencies 
served by your PSAP? 
 
Complete coordination: Essentially, the Fire agencies act as one large fire 
department. SOPs and communications are integrated, and the closest units 
are dispatched regardless of jurisdictional boundaries or incident size. 
 
Automatic Mutual Aid: Mutual aid is automatic for large incidents, but 
routine incidents are dispatched according to jurisdictional boundaries if units 
from the primary jurisdiction are available. 
 Mutual Aid on Request: Incidents are dispatched with respect to jurisdictional boundaries; mutual aid agreements are in place but must be activated. 
 Jurisdictional: Incidents are dispatched purely based on jurisdictional boundaries 
 Other (please explain in comments section) 
 









24) How often do different Fire agencies served by your PSAP operate together 
at routine FIRE (not to include EMS) incidents? (For the purpose of this question, 
routine incidents are those that occur regularly or require less than three units or 
one hour to mitigate)  
 Daily 
 Frequently (once/week or more) 
 Occasionally (a few times a month) 
 Infrequently (less than once/month) 
 Almost never 
 
Comments (if needed): 
25) In situations described by the previous question, how often are 
communications facilitated by the PSAP to ensure that radio communications are 
possible unit-to-unit and firefighter-to-fighter regardless of agency?  
 Every time by design – radios are compatible 
 Every time 
 Most of the time 
 Infrequently  
 Almost never 
 
26) How often do different Fire agencies served by your PSAP operate together 
at routine EMS incidents? (For the purpose of this question, routine incidents are 
those that occur regularly or require less than three units or one hour to mitigate)  
 Daily 
 Frequently (once/week or more) 
 Occasionally (a few times a month) 
 Infrequently (less than once/month) 
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 Almost never 
 EMS is not provided by Fire 
 
Comments (if needed): 
 
27) In situations described by the previous question, how often are 
communications facilitated by the PSAP to ensure that radio communications are 
possible unit-to-unit and firefighter-to-firefighter regardless of agency?  
 Every time by design – radios are compatible 
 Every time 
 Most of the time 
 Infrequently  
 Almost never 
 
Comments (if needed): 
 
28) How often do different Fire agencies served by your PSAP operate together 
at less-routine incidents? (For the purpose of this question, less-routine incidents are 
those that require more than three units and more than one hour to mitigate)  
 Daily 
 Frequently (once/week or more) 
 Occasionally (a few times a month) 
 Infrequently (less than once/month) 
 Almost never 
 
Comments (if needed): 
 
29) In situations described by the previous question, how often are 
communications facilitated by the PSAP to ensure that radio communications are 
possible unit-to-unit and firefighter-to-fighter regardless of agency?  
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 Every time by design – radios are compatible 
 Every time 
 Most of the time 
 Infrequently  
 Almost never 
 
Comments (if needed): 
SECTION 3: SKIP THIS SECTION IF YOUR PSAP DOES NOT SERVE ANY 
LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES OR IF YOUR PSAP SERVES A SINGLE 
LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY 
 
30) Which best describes your model for Intra-Discipline coordination among 
Law Enforcement agencies served by your PSAP? 
 
Complete coordination: Essentially, the Law Enforcement agencies act as one 
large police department. SOPs and communications are integrated, and the 
closest units are dispatched regardless of jurisdictional boundaries or incident 
size. 
 
Automatic Mutual Aid: Mutual aid is automatic for large incidents, but 
routine incidents are dispatched according to jurisdictional boundaries if units 
from the primary jurisdiction are available. 
 Mutual Aid on Request: Incidents are dispatched with respect to jurisdictional boundaries; mutual aid agreements are in place but must be activated. 
 Jurisdictional: Incidents are dispatched purely based on jurisdictional boundaries 
 Other (please explain in comments section) 
 
Comments (if needed): 
  
31) How often do different Law Enforcement agencies served by your PSAP 
operate together at routine incidents? (For the purpose of this question, routine 
incidents are those that occur regularly or require less than three units or one hour 







 Frequently (once/week or more) 
 Occasionally (a few times a month) 
 Infrequently (less than once/month) 
 Almost never 
 
32) In situations described by the previous question, how often are 
communications facilitated by the PSAP to ensure that radio communications are 
possible unit-to-unit and officer-to-officer, regardless of agency?  
 Every time by design—radios are compatible 
 Every time 
 Most of the time 
 Infrequently  
 Almost never 
 
Comments (if needed): 
 
 
33) How often do different Law Enforcement agencies served by your PSAP 
operate together at less-routine incidents? (For the purpose of this question, less-
routine incidents are those that require more than three units and more than one 
hour to mitigate)  
 Daily 
 Frequently (once/week or more) 
 Occasionally (a few times a month) 
 Infrequently (less than once/month) 
 Almost never 
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Comments (if needed): 
 
34) In situations described by the previous question, how often are 
communications facilitated by the PSAP to ensure that radio communications are 
possible unit-to-unit and officer-to-officer, regardless of agency?  
 Every time by design—radios are compatible 
 Every time 
 Most of the time 
 Infrequently  
 Almost never 
 
Comments (if needed): 
 
 
PART VI: OPERATIONAL INTER-DISCIPLINE INTEROPERABILITY 
 
35) Regardless of what type of PSAP you operate, how often do Fire and Police 
agencies operate together at routine incidents in the area you service? (For the 
purpose of this question, routine incidents are those that occur regularly or require 
less than three units or one hour to mitigate)  
 Daily 
 Frequently (once/week or more) 
 Occasionally (a few times a month) 
 Infrequently (less than once/month) 
 Almost never 
 
Comments (if needed): 
 
 
36) In situations described by the previous question, how often are 
communications facilitated by the PSAP to ensure that radio communications are 
possible unit-to-unit and officer-to-fighter? 
 127 
 Every time by design—radios are compatible 
 Every time 
 Most of the time 
 Infrequently  
 Almost never 
 
Comments (if needed): 
 
37) Regardless of what type of PSAP you operate, how often do Fire and Police 
agencies operate together at routine EMS incidents in the area you service? (For the 
purpose of this question, routine incidents are those that occur regularly or require 
less than three units or one hour to mitigate)  
 Daily 
 Frequently (once/week or more) 
 Occasionally (a few times a month) 
 Infrequently (less than once/month) 
 Almost never 
 
38) In situations described by the previous question, how often are 
communications facilitated by the PSAP to ensure that radio communications are 
possible unit-to-unit and EMT-to-officer regardless of agency?  
 Every time by design—radios are compatible 
 Every time 
 Most of the time 
 Infrequently  
 Almost never 
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Comments (if needed): 
 
39) Regardless of what type of PSAP you operate, how often do Fire and Police 
agencies operate together at less routine incidents in the area you service (For the 
purpose of this question, less-routine incidents are those that require more than 
three units and more than one hour to mitigate)  
 Daily 
 Frequently (once/week or more) 
 Occasionally (a few times a month) 
 Infrequently (less than once/month) 
 Almost never 
 
Comments (if needed): 
 
40) In situations described by the previous question, how often are 
communications facilitated by the PSAP to ensure that radio communications are 
possible unit-to-unit and officer-to-fighter regardless of agency?  
 Every time by design—radios are compatible 
 Every time 
 Most of the time 
 Infrequently  
 Almost never 
 




PART VII: YOUR PSAP 
 
41) Is there anything in particular I should know about the operations of your 





PART VIII: Follow Up 
 
1)  In the following situations, how often do firefighters actually communicate 
directly with police officers unit-to-unit or firefighter-to-police officer on the same 
radio channel? (Do not include situations where messages are relayed through the 
PSAP or through a unified command structure. Please consider only DIRECT 




































































(Incidents that occur regularly or require less 
than three units and more than one hour to 
mitigate) 
     
Less-routine incidents 
(Incidents that require more than three units 
and more than one hour to mitigate) 
     
 
2) If police and fire agencies operating together at ROUTINE INCIDENTS only 
communicate unit-to-unit and firefighter-to-officer a few times a month or less 
despite the capability to do so every time, why is that?  CHECK ALL THAT 
APPLY 
 
 Routine incidents do not typically require inter-discipline radio communications 
 Communications at routine incidents are typically handled face-to-face 
 Police and fire are working on discipline specific objectives at incidents, and thus do not require radio communications 
 Police and fire communicating on the same channel make the channel too cluttered with transmissions for effective communications 
 Police and fire utilize different communications protocols which are not compatible 
 Police and fire operate through a unified command structure, which obviates the need for firefighter-to-police officer voice communications 
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 Training issue – police and fire are unable to take full advantage of this capability 
 Organizational culture is an impediment 
 OTHER: Please specify in comment section below.  
 
3) If police and fire agencies operating at LESS ROUTINE INCIDENTS only 
communicate unit-to-unit and firefighter-to-officer a few times a month or less 
despite the capability to do so every time, why is that?  CHECK ALL THAT 
APPLY 
 
 Less-routine incidents do not typically require inter-discipline radio communications 
 Communications at routine incidents are typically handled face-to-face 
 Police and fire are working on discipline specific objectives at incidents, and thus do not require radio communications 
 Police and fire communicating on the same channel make the channel too cluttered with transmissions for effective communications 
 Police and fire utilize different communications protocols which are not compatible 
 Police and fire operate through a unified command structure, which obviates the need for firefighter-to-police officer voice communications 
 Training issue – police and fire are unable to take full advantage of this capability 
 Organizational culture is an impediment 
 OTHER: Please specify in comment section below.  
 
4) IF YOUR PSAP DOES NOT DISPARCH FOR ANY LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, SKIP TO QUESTION 7. 
In the original survey, you indicated that your system has the capability for police 
from different agencies to communicate unit-to-unit and officer-to-officer via radio. 
 
In the following situations, how often do police officers from different agencies 
actually communicate directly on the same radio channel? (Do not include situations 
where messages are relayed through the PSAP or through a unified command 




































































(Incidents that occur regularly or require less 
than three units and more than one hour to 
mitigate) 
     
Less-routine incidents 
(Incidents that require more than three units 
and more than one hour to mitigate) 
     
 
IF YOU ANSWERED ONLY “DAILY” OR “FREQUENTLY” TO THE ABOVE, 
YOU ARE FINISHED. THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION. IF ANY 
OTHER ANSWERS, PLEASE CONTINUE. 
 
5) If different police agencies operating at ROUTINE INCIDENTS only 
communicate on the same channel a few times a month or less despite the capability 
to do so every time, why is that?  CHECK ALL THAT APPLY 
 
 Routine incidents do not typically require intra-discipline radio communications 
 Communications at routine incidents are typically handled face-to-face 
 Different agencies communicating on the same channel make the channel too cluttered with transmissions for effective communications 
 Different agencies utilize different communications protocols which are not compatible 
 Police operate through a unified command structure, which obviates the need for firefighter-to-police officer voice communications 
 Training issue – police are unable to take full advantage of this capability 
 Organizational culture is an impediment 
 OTHER: Please specify in comment section below.  
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6) If different police agencies operating at LESS ROUTINE INCIDENTS only 
communicate on the same channel a few times a month or less despite the capability 
to do so every time, why is that?  CHECK ALL THAT APPLY 
 
 Routine incidents do not typically require intra-discipline radio communications 
 Communications at routine incidents are typically handled face-to-face 
 Different agencies communicating on the same channel make the channel too cluttered with transmissions for effective communications 
 Different agencies utilize different communications protocols which are not compatible 
 Police operate through a unified command structure, which obviates the need for firefighter-to-police officer voice communications 
 Training issue – police are unable to take full advantage of this capability 
 Organizational culture is an impediment 
 OTHER: Please specify in comment section below.  
 
7)  IF YOUR PSAP DOES NOT DISPARCH FOR ANY FIRE AGENCIES, 
YOU ARE DONE. 
In the original survey, you indicated that your system has the capability for 
firefighters from different agencies to communicate unit-to-unit and officer-to-
officer via radio. 
 
In the following situations, how often do firefighters from different agencies actually 
communicate directly on the same radio channel? (Do not include situations where 
messages are relayed through the PSAP or through a unified command structure. 




































































(Incidents that occur regularly or require less 
than three units and more than one hour to 




(Incidents that require more than three units 
and more than one hour to mitigate) 
x     
 
IF YOU ANSWERED ONLY “DAILY” OR “FREQUENTLY” TO THE ABOVE, 
YOU ARE FINISHED. THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION. IF ANY 
OTHER ANSWERS, PLEASE CONTINUE. 
 
8) If different fire agencies operating at ROUTINE INCIDENTS only 
communicate on the same channel a few times a month or less despite the capability 
to do so every time, why is that?  CHECK ALL THAT APPLY 
 
 Routine incidents do not typically require intra-discipline radio communications 
 Communications at routine incidents are typically handled face-to-face 
 Different agencies communicating on the same channel make the channel too cluttered with transmissions for effective communications 
 Different agencies utilize different communications protocols which are not compatible 
 Police operate through a unified command structure, which obviates the need for firefighter-to-police officer voice communications 
 Training issue – police are unable to take full advantage of this capability 
 Organizational culture is an impediment 
 OTHER: Please specify in comment section below.  
 
Comments (please comment utilizing complete sentences that may be quoted in 
thesis text): 
 
9) If different fire agencies operating at LESS ROUTINE INCIDENTS only 
communicate on the same channel a few times a month or less despite the capability 
to do so every time, why is that?  CHECK ALL THAT APPLY 
 
 Routine incidents do not typically require intra-discipline radio communications 
 Communications at routine incidents are typically handled face-to-face 
 Different agencies communicating on the same channel make the channel too cluttered with transmissions for effective communications 
 Different agencies utilize different communications protocols which are not compatible 
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 Police operate through a unified command structure, which obviates the need for firefighter-to-police officer voice communications 
 Training issue – police are unable to take full advantage of this capability 
 Organizational culture is an impediment 
 OTHER: Please specify in comment section below.  
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